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Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions

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  • G. Schwartz

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  • G. Schwartz, 2000. "Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s17, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00s17
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    2. Chao, Hung-po & Wilson, Robert, 1987. "Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 899-916, December.
    3. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October.
    4. Michael A. Kouparitsas, 1997. "A dynamic macroeconomic analysis of NAFTA," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 21(Jan), pages 14-35.
    5. James R. Hines, Jr., 1996. "Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations," NBER Working Papers 5589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1999. "Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    7. Kalai, Ehud & Postlewaite, Andrew & Roberts, John, 1978. "Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: Nonmonotonicity of the core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 200-209, October.
    8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    9. James R. Markusen & Keith E. Maskus, 2001. "Multinational Firms: Reconciling Theory and Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Topics in Empirical International Economics: A Festschrift in Honor of Robert E. Lipsey, pages 71-98, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Michael A. Kouparitsas, 1997. "Economic gains from trade liberalization--NAFTA's impact," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Oct.
    11. repec:umd:umdeco:rodriguez9901 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Contract Incompleteness, Contractual Enforcement and Bureaucracies," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s16, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    13. Pravin Krishna, 2003. "Are Regional Trading Partners "Natural"?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 202-231, February.
    14. Francisco Rodríguez & Dani Rodrik, 2001. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 261-338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Arvind Panagariya & Jagdish Bhagwati, 1996. "The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 51856, September.
    16. Joseph Stiglitz, 1998. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    17. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
    18. K.C. Fung & Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance," International Trade 9411002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. S. Lael Brainard, 1993. "An Empirical Assessment of the Factor Proportions Explanation of Multi-National Sales," NBER Working Papers 4583, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Rodney D. Ludema, 1991. "International Trade Bargaining And The Most‐Favored‐Nation Clause," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 1-20, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Contract Incompleteness, Contractual Enforcement and Bureaucracies," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s16, Economics Department, Princeton University.

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