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Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance

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  • K.C. Fung
  • Robert W. Staiger

Abstract

We explore the relationship between trade adjustment subsidies and successful reciprocal trade liberalization. We consider economies that are faced with a periodic need to move resources out of a declining import-competing sector, and that are attempting to sustain cooperative but self-enforcing trade agreements in the face of these adjustment needs. If the limitations associated with enforcement of international trade agreements are sufficiently severe, trade adjustment assistance can facilitate reciprocal trade liberalization. We argue that this suggests a possible efficiency rationale for adjustment policies that treat resources differently when traded sectors are involved.

Suggested Citation

  • K.C. Fung & Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance," NBER Working Papers 4847, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4847
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. Peter Neary, 1982. "Intersectoral Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and the Case for Adjustment Assistance," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 39-72, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lapan, Harvey E, 1988. "The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 395-401, June.
    3. Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 123-150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    5. Michael Mussa, 1982. "Government Policy and the Adjustment Process," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 73-122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    7. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-795, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Didier LAUSSEL & Philippe MICHEL & Thierry Paul, 2004. "Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004023, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. G. Schwartz, 2000. "Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s17, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    3. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2002. "Unilateralism in a Multilateral World," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 266-292, April.
    4. Didier Laussel & Philippe Michel & Thierry Paul, 2004. "Intersectoral adjustment and unemployment in a two-country Ricardian model. Une approche par la méthode événementielle," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 169-192.
    5. Furusawa, Taiji & Lai, Edwin L. -C., 1999. "Adjustment costs and gradual trade liberalization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 333-361, December.
    6. Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Economic Theory," International Trade 0412007, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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