Although many complain that the clientele served by government programs routinely expands, there exists no analytic model with suggests how policy implementation may result in such growth. This paper shows that peer effects, where each bureaucrat compares his behavior or that of all others, can cause policy clientele to increase over time--what we label bureaucratic creep-- particularly when bureaucrats interact with many potential recipients.
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