IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/csledp/9503.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations

Author

Listed:
  • Heiner, Ronald Asher
  • Schmidtchen, Dieter

Abstract

The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices better than pure chance), then "conditionally cooperative" Nash equilibria may exist in addition to the "always defect" equilibrium. By "conditionally cooperative" we mean that players do not cooperate because of a behavioral "disposition" to act cooperatively, but cooperate rather selectively contingent on their forecasting of the opponent's cooperation (cooperate if and only if each other is forecasted to cooperate).

Suggested Citation

  • Heiner, Ronald Asher & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1995. "Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9503
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23093/1/9503pd.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
    4. Guth, W. & Kliemt, H., 1993. "Competition or Co-Operation," Papers 9339, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    5. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    6. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
    7. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-550, May.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P, 1990. "Explicit Communication and Bargaining Outcomes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 213-219, May.
    9. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
    10. Bolle, Friedel & Ockenfels, Peter, 1990. "Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 69-84, March.
    11. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-595, September.
    12. Philip J. Reny, 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 103-118, Fall.
    13. Heiner, Ronald A., 1988. "The necessity of imperfect decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 29-55, July.
    14. Cornell, Stephen & Kalt, Joseph P, 1995. "Where Does Economic Development Really Come From? Constitutional Rule among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 402-426, July.
    15. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December.
    16. Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-1180, December.
    17. Johnson, James, 1993. "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 74-86, March.
    18. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    19. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    20. Heiner, Ronald A., 1989. "The origin of predictable dynamic behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 233-257, October.
    21. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kirstein, Roland & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1997. "Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 509-520, December.
    2. Max Albert & Ronald A. Heiner, 2003. "An Indirect-Evolution Approad to Newcomb's Problem," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 20, pages 161-194.
    3. Rolf Ziegler, 1998. "Trust And The Reliability Of Expectations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(4), pages 427-450, November.
    4. Alfred Endres & Cornelia Ohl, 2000. "Taxes versus quotas to limit global environmental risks: new insights into an old affair," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(4), pages 399-423, December.
    5. Schmidtchen Dieter, 2006. "Wettbewerbsschutz durch regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild / Protecting competition by a rule governed policy – Remarks on th," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 57(1), pages 165-189, January.
    6. Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2000. "Homo oeconomicus und das Recht," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2000-03, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    7. Alfred Endres & Cornelia Ohl, 2000. "Taxes versus quotas to limit global environmental risks: new insights into an old affair," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 3(4), pages 399-423, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frey, Bruno S. & Bohnet, Iris, 1997. "Identification in democratic society," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-38.
    2. Hong, Fuhai & Lim, Wooyoung, 2016. "Voluntary participation in public goods provision with Coasian bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 102-119.
    3. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1998. "Culture, Circles, And Commercials," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(1), pages 47-75, February.
    4. Iraj J. Fooladi & Nargess K. Kayhani, 2003. "Is Entrepreneurship Only About Entering A New Business," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 8(2), pages 1-11, Summer.
    5. Arshad Ali Javed & Patrick T.I. Lam & Albert P.C. Chan, 2014. "Change negotiation in public-private partnership projects through output specifications: an experimental approach based on game theory," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 323-348, April.
    6. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    7. Miettinen, Topi, 2013. "Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 68-84.
    8. R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?," Discussion Paper Series dp387, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    10. Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, 2010. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
    12. Shyam Sunder, 2001. "Knowing What Others Know: Common Knowledge, Accounting, and Capital Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm326, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2002.
    13. Sally, David, 2005. "Can I say "bobobo" and mean "There's no such thing as cheap talk"?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 245-266, July.
    14. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    15. Markus Pasche, 2013. "What Can be Learned from Behavioural Economics for Environmental Policy?," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    16. Terje Lensberg & Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe, 2019. "Evolutionary Stable Solution Concepts for the Initial Play," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1916, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    17. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018. "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 153-181.
    18. Xiao Luo & Ben Wang, 2022. "An epistemic characterization of MACA," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 995-1024, June.
    19. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2009. "Field Centipedes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1619-1635, September.
    20. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    prisoner's dilemma; reliability condition; forecasting ability; trust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9503. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fosaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.