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What Can be Learned from Behavioural Economics for Environmental Policy?

  • Markus Pasche

    ()

    (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)

Behavioural economics attracted attention from environmental economists: it should help to understand why people do not respond to environmental policy measures, based on neoclassical assumptions, as predicted by theory. Moreover, understanding motives and driving forces behind pro-social, pro-environmental and cooperative behaviour should help to improve environmental policy design. The aim of this paper is a critical discussion of the way how this branch of research is interpreting the explanatory power and the normative (policy) implications of behavioural economics.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2013-020.

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Date of creation: 08 May 2013
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-020
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