Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis
There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brons, Martijn & Nijkamp, Peter & Pels, Eric & Rietveld, Piet, 2008. "A meta-analysis of the price elasticity of gasoline demand. A SUR approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2105-2122, September.
- Martin Halla & Friedrich Schneider & Alexander Wagner, 2013.
"Satisfaction with democracy and collective action problems: the case of the environment,"
Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 109-137, April.
- Halla, Martin & Schneider, Friedrich & Wagner, Alexander F., 2008. "Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective Action Problems: The Case of the Environment," IZA Discussion Papers 3613, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Martin Halla & Friedrich Schneider & Alexander Wagner, 2008. "Satisfaction with Democracy and Collective Action Problems: The Case of the Environment," Economics working papers 2008-08, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Schneider, Friedrich & Volkert, Juergen, 1999. "No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 123-138, October.
- Ghalwash, Tarek, 2004. "Energy Taxes as a Signaling Device: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Preferences," Umeå Economic Studies 646, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- John A. List & Daniel M. Sturm, 2006.
"How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1249-1281.
- Daniel Sturm & John List, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," Natural Field Experiments 00482, The Field Experiments Website.
- John A. List & Daniel M. Sturm, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," NBER Working Papers 10609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- John A., List & Daniel, Sturm, 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers in Economics 768, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- List, John & Sturm, Daniel M, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4489, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rainer Eising, 2007. "Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices," European Union Politics, SAGE Publishing, vol. 8(3), pages 329-362, September.
- Oates, Wallace E. & Portney, Paul R., 2003.
"The political economy of environmental policy,"
Handbook of Environmental Economics,
in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 325-354
- Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
- Brännlund, Runar & Persson, Lars, 2010.
"Tax or no tax? Preferences for climate policy attributes,"
Umeå Economic Studies
802, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Brännlund, Runar & Persson, Lars, 2010. "Tax or no tax? Preferences for climate policy attributes," CERE Working Papers 2010:4, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics.
- Owens, Susan & Driffill, Louise, 2008. "How to change attitudes and behaviours in the context of energy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 4412-4418, December.
- Santos, Rui & Antunes, Paula & Baptista, Gualter & Mateus, Pedro & Madruga, Luisa, 2006. "Stakeholder participation in the design of environmental policy mixes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 100-110, November.
- Welsch, Heinz, 2009. "Implications of happiness research for environmental economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(11), pages 2735-2742, September.
- Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2002.
"Rent-seeking and grandfathering: The case of GHG trade in the EU,"
35/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2004. "Rent-Seeking and Grandfathering: The Case of GHG Trade in the Eu," Energy & Environment, SAGE Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 69-80, January.
- Philippe Thalmann, 2004. "The Public Acceptance of Green Taxes: 2 Million Voters Express Their Opinion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 179-217, 04.
- Patuelli, Roberto & Nijkamp, Peter & Pels, Eric, 2005.
"Environmental tax reform and the double dividend: A meta-analytical performance assessment,"
Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 564-583, December.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner & Friedrich Schneider, 2002.
"On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
741, CESifo Group Munich.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Karen Palmer & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, 2009.
"An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits,"
IEW - Working Papers
429, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Karen Palmer & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, 2010. "An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 514-525, 04-05.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palmer, Karen & Shobe, William & Burtraw, Dallas, 2009. "An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits," Discussion Papers dp-09-39, Resources For the Future.
- Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Löschel, Andreas, 2010. "Paying the piper and calling the tune?: A meta-regression analysis of the double-dividend hypothesis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(7), pages 1495-1502, May.
- Aidt, Toke S., 2010. "Green taxes: Refunding rules and lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-43, July.
- Agnolucci, Paolo, 2009. "The effect of the German and British environmental taxation reforms: A simple assessment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3043-3051, August.
- Markussen, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard & Vesterdal, Morten, 2002. "The political economy of a tradable GHG permit market in the European Union," Working Papers 02-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- McCann, Laura & Colby, Bonnie & Easter, K. William & Kasterine, Alexander & Kuperan, K.V., 2005. "Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(4), pages 527-542, March.
- repec:ags:aare05:139304 is not listed on IDEAS
- Welsch, Heinz, 2006. "Environment and happiness: Valuation of air pollution using life satisfaction data," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 801-813, July.
- Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, .
"Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated,"
IEW - Working Papers
098, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bohringer, Christoph & Vogt, Carsten, 2004. "The dismantling of a breakthrough: the Kyoto Protocol as symbolic policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 597-617, September.
- Betz, Regina, 2006. "Emissions trading to combat climate change: The impact of scheme design on transaction costs," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 174096, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2002. "Lobbyism and CO2 trade in the EU," Working Papers 02-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Romero-Jordán, Desiderio & del Río, Pablo & Jorge-García, Marta & Burguillo, Mercedes, 2010. "Price and income elasticities of demand for passenger transport fuels in Spain. Implications for public policies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 3898-3909, August.
- Daniel Graham & Stephen Glaister, 2005. "Decomposing the determinants of road traffic demand," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 19-28.
- Bornstein, Nicholas & Lanz, Bruno, 2008. "Voting on the environment: Price or ideology? Evidence from Swiss referendums," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 430-440, October.
- David Anthoff & Robert Hahn, 2010. "Government failure and market failure: on the inefficiency of environmental and energy policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(2), pages 197-224, Summer.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- Wustenhagen, Rolf & Bilharz, Michael, 2006. "Green energy market development in Germany: effective public policy and emerging customer demand," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(13), pages 1681-1696, September.
- Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-97-25, Resources For the Future.
- Markussen, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2005. "Industry lobbying and the political economy of GHG trade in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 245-255, January.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, September.
- Sebastian Goers & Alexander Wagner & Jürgen Wegmayr, 2010. "New and old market-based instruments for climate change policy," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(1), pages 1-30, June.
- Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard & Daugbjerg, Carsten & Hjollund, Lene & Pedersen, Anders Branth, 2001. "Consumers, industrialists and the political economy of green taxation: CO2 taxation in OECD," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 489-497, May.
- Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "The Political Economy of Climate Change Policy in the EU: Auction and Grandfathering," Working Papers 51/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Felder, Stefan & Schleiniger, Reto, 2002. "Environmental tax reform: efficiency and political feasibility," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 107-116, August.
- Cristina Ciocirlan & Bruce Yandle, 2003. "The Political Economy of Green Taxation in OECD Countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-218, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:2:y:2010:i:12:p:3710-3734:d:10376. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (XML Conversion Team)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.