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Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union

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  • Gullberg, Anne Therese

Abstract

Drawing on two conflicting hypotheses from the theoretical literature on lobbying, I consider the strategies applied by interest groups lobbying to influence climate policy in the European Union (EU). The first hypothesis claims that interest groups lobby their 'friends', decision-makers with positions similar to their own. The second claims that interest groups lobby their 'foes', decision-makers with positions opposed to their own. Using interviews with lobbyists and decision-makers, I demonstrate that in the field of climate policy, interest groups in the EU lobby both friends and foes, but under different conditions. Moreover, I find that the interest groups' motives are not always in line with the theoretical hypotheses. Interest groups lobby their friends on single policy decisions to exchange information, to further a common cause and to exert pressure, and their foes because a foe on one issue might prove to be a friend on another issue. Interest groups direct general lobbying towards both friends and foes. This paper provides a new empirical contribution to a literature that has so far been heavily dominated by studies focusing on lobbying in the US.

Suggested Citation

  • Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:36:y:2008:i:8:p:2954-2962
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    10. Potters, Jan & Van Winden, Frans, 1990. "Modelling political pressure as transmission of information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 61-88, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Förster, Manuel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 2016. "Trust and manipulation in social networks," Network Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 216-243, June.
    2. Dumas, Marion & Rising, James & Urpelainen, Johannes, 2016. "Political competition and renewable energy transitions over long time horizons: A dynamic approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 175-184.
    3. Krumm, Raimund & Volkert, Jürgen, 2015. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der politischen Realisierbarkeit intra- und intergenerativer Gerechtigkeit," UFZ Discussion Papers 11/2015, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).
    4. repec:eee:crpeac:v:24:y:2013:i:6:p:397-409 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Sühlsen, Kathrin & Hisschemöller, Matthijs, 2014. "Lobbying the ‘Energiewende’. Assessing the effectiveness of strategies to promote the renewable energy business in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 316-325.
    6. Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, 2011. "Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor's Orders? Mostly no! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan before and after the Earthquake," CESifo Working Paper Series 3639, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Katharina Rietig, 2011. "Public pressure versus lobbying � how do Environmental NGOs matter most in climate negotiations?," GRI Working Papers 70, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    8. Manuel Förster & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Trust and Manipulation in Social Networks," Post-Print halshs-00881145, HAL.
    9. repec:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-016-9262-z is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:eco:journ2:2017-05-13 is not listed on IDEAS

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