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Designing Permit Trading

In: Green Taxation in Question

Author

Listed:
  • Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

Abstract

Chapter 5 suggested how green taxation could be designed to overcome political opposition. However, it was difficult to find appropriate green tax designs for heterogeneous industries because they would cause politically controversial redistribution among firms or sectors. Potential losers following redistribution would have strong incentives to oppose any such tax scheme and consequently, as argued in Chapter 1, the environmental results would be undermined. Therefore, we will now show how permit trading can overcome political opposition. This solution can be effected utilizing the main feature of ‘grandfathering’, where by the property right to emission rights is freely transferred on the basis of certain distribution rules (Tietenberg 1985).

Suggested Citation

  • Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2001. "Designing Permit Trading," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Green Taxation in Question, chapter 6, pages 137-167, Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59553-8_6
    DOI: 10.1057/9780230595538_6
    as

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    Cited by:

    1. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
    2. Anne Gullberg, 2008. "Rational lobbying and EU climate policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 161-178, June.

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