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Rational lobbying and EU climate policy

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  • Anne Gullberg

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  • Anne Gullberg, 2008. "Rational lobbying and EU climate policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 161-178, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ieaple:v:8:y:2008:i:2:p:161-178
    DOI: 10.1007/s10784-008-9067-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beate Kohler-Koch & Christine Quittkat, 1999. "Intermediation of Interests in the European Union," MZES Working Papers 9, MZES.
    2. Markussen, Peter & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2005. "Industry lobbying and the political economy of GHG trade in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 245-255, January.
    3. Pieter Bouwen, 2004. "The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 473-495, September.
    4. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Rainer Eising, 2005. "The access of business interests to European Union institutions: notes towards a theory," ARENA Working Papers 29, ARENA.
    6. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2001. "Designing Permit Trading," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Green Taxation in Question, chapter 6, pages 137-167, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 1999. "U.S. Interest Groups Prefer Emission Trading: A New Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 109-128, October.
    8. Hojnacki, Marie & Kimball, David C., 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 775-790, December.
    9. Atle C. Christiansen & J�rgen Wettestad, 2003. "The EU as a frontrunner on greenhouse gas emissions trading: how did it happen and will the EU succeed?," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 3-18, March.
    10. Carsten Daugbjerg & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2001. "Designing Green Taxation," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Green Taxation in Question, chapter 5, pages 117-135, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
    12. Carsten Daugbjerg & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2001. "Green Taxation in Question," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-59553-8, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen Arguedas & Dietrich Earnhart & Sandra Rousseau, 2017. "Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 159-183, April.
    2. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
    3. Arguedas, Carmen & Earnhart, Dietrich & Rousseau, Sandra, 2013. "Effluent Limits, Ambient Quality, and Monitoring," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2013/08, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    4. Naciye Bey, 2022. "Configurational analysis of environmental NGOs and their influence on environmental policy in Turkey," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12, December.

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