IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v11y2010i4p553-575.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees

Author

Listed:
  • David Marshall

    () (London School of Economics and Political Science, UK)

Abstract

This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament's committees shape lobbyists' strategic behaviour. Committees' informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee's final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists' preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • David Marshall, 2010. "Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 553-575, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:553-575
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eup.sagepub.com/content/11/4/553.abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Roland Vaubel & Bernhard Klingen & David Müller, 2012. "There is life after the Commission: An empirical analysis of private interest representation by former EU-commissioners, 1981–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 59-80, March.
    2. Maja Kluger Rasmussen, 2015. "The Battle for Influence: The Politics of Business Lobbying in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 365-382, March.
    3. repec:elg:eechap:15325_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Adriana Bunea, 2014. "Explaining Interest Groups' Articulation of Policy Preferences in the European Commission's Open Consultations: An Analysis of the Environmental Policy Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(6), pages 1224-1241, November.
    5. repec:spr:revint:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-016-9262-z is not listed on IDEAS
    6. David Marshall, 2015. "Explaining Interest Group Interactions with Party Group Members in the European Parliament: Dominant Party Groups and Coalition Formation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 311-329, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:553-575. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.