P-Stable Equilibrium : Definition and Some Properties
We define a continuous index of strategic stability,p.stability, which requires equilibrium to be the unique outcome compatible with common knowledge of rationality and common knowledge of p.beliefs (beliefs that put probability at least p on the equilibrium profile). We show that every equilibrium (within a large class) is p-stable for some p
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