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Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian

Author

Listed:
  • Francesca Busetto

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Udine, 33100 Udine, Italy)

  • Giulio Codognato

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sta, EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Ludovic Julien

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we show that, when atoms have Leontievian utility functions, any Walras allocation is a Cournot–Nash allocation. This result, together with the main theorem proved in Busetto et al. (2020), implies the equivalence between the set of Cournot–Nash allocations and the set of Walras allocations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Ludovic Julien, 2021. "Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian," Post-Print halshs-05031794, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05031794
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110043
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Giorgia Pavan & Simone Tonin, 2023. "Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 121-140, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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