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An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets

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Abstract

Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium has puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evo- lutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies remove loss- making contracts from the market and copy pro t-making ones. Occasionally, they also experiment, adding new contracts or removing current ones arbitrarily. We show that the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome arises in the long run if it consti- tutes an equilibrium in the static framework, but also if it is not an equilibrium, provided that rms only experiment with contracts in the vicinity of their current portfolio.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana B. Ania & Thomas Tröger & Wambach, 1989. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets," Vienna Economics Papers 9808, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:9808
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    Cited by:

    1. Luigi Buzzacchi & Tommaso Valletti, 2005. "Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 71-97, June.
    2. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2014. "New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 136-152, September.
    4. Joel S. Demski, 2003. "Corporate Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 51-72, Spring.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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