Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets
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- Luigi Buzzacchi & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2005. "Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 71-97, June.
References listed on IDEAS
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
- Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July.
- Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-344, April.
- Ana B. Ania & Thomas Tröger & Wambach, 1989. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets," Vienna Economics Papers 9808, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Bond, Eric W & Crocker, Keith J, 1991. "Smoking, Skydiving, and Knitting: The Endogenous Categorization of Risks in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 177-200, February.
- Kavalec, Chris & Woods, James, 1999. "Toward marginal cost pricing of accident risk: the energy, travel, and welfare impacts of pay-at-the-pump auto insurance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 331-342, June.
- Richard Schmalensee, 1984. "Imperfect Information and the Equitability of Competitive Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 441-460.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Block, Walter & Snow, Nicholas & Stringham, Edward, 2008. "Banks, insurance companies, and discrimination," MPRA Paper 26035, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
- Schwarze, Reimund & Wein, Thomas, 2005.
"Is the market classification of risk always efficient? Evidence from German third party motor insurance,"
German Risk and Insurance Review (GRIR),
University of Cologne, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, vol. 1(4), pages 173-202.
- Reimund Schwarze & Thomas Wein, 2005. "Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
- Schwarze, Reimund & Wein, Thomas, 2005. "Is the market classification of risk always efficient? evidence from german third party motor insurance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 36104, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner, 2009. "On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 280, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ron Cheung & Cassandra R. Cole & David A. Macpherson & Kathleen A. McCullough & Charles Nyce, 2015. "Demographic Factors and Price Distortions in Insurance," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 18(1), pages 1-28, March.
- Cannon, Edmund & Cipriani, Giam Pietro & Bazar-Rosen, Katia, 2014. "Surprising Selection Effects in the UK Car Insurance Market," IZA Discussion Papers 8172, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Imke Reimers & Benjamin R. Shiller, 2018. "Proprietary Data, Competition, and Consumer Effort: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance," Working Papers 119, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
More about this item
Keywordsprice discrimination; insurance classification; equity; variable insurance charges;
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