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Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance

Author

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  • Reimund Schwarze

    (Department of Energy, Transportation, Environment, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin)

  • Thomas Wein

    (Institute of Economics, University of Lüneburg)

Abstract

The efficiency of market-determined risk classification in automobile insurance is a lasting matter of controversy. It can be traced back to the 1950s (Muir, 1957) and received broad economic attention in the 1980s when spiralling car insurance premiums in the US were blamed on tariff regulations prohibiting the use of sex, age and location as risk characteristics (Blackmon/ Zeckhauser 1991, Cummins/ Tennyson 1992, Harrington/ Doerpinghaus 1993). In a mirroring move the EU saw a heated political and legal debate on the use of special tariffs for foreigners, in the 1980s, which resulted in a legal ban of ‘discriminatory’ tariffs for mandatory insurance schemes in many European countries. The latest blow against risk classification in car insurance comes with the EU Employment and Social Affairs’ draft directive on gender equality which proposes to prohibit gender specific calculation of all private insurance products, including non-mandatory branches such as life, private health or comprehensive car insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Reimund Schwarze & Thomas Wein, 2005. "Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance," Working Paper Series in Economics 3, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lue:wpaper:3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. R. Guy Thomas, 2008. "Loss Coverage as a Public Policy Objective for Risk Classification Schemes," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 997-1018, December.
    2. David A. Cather, 2020. "Reconsidering insurance discrimination and adverse selection in an era of data analytics," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 45(3), pages 426-456, July.
    3. Deborah Mabbett, 2011. "A Rights Revolution in Europe? Regulatory and judicial approaches to nondiscrimination in insurance," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 38, European Institute, LSE.
    4. Deborah Mabbett, 2014. "Polanyi in Brussels or Luxembourg? Social rights and market regulation in European insurance," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 186-202, June.
    5. Donatella Porrini, 2015. "Risk Classification Efficiency and the Insurance Market Regulation," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, September.

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    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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