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Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests

  • Strohmenger, R.
  • Wambach, A.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 197-218

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:19:y:2000:i:2:p:197-218
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  1. Cook, Philip J & Graham, Daniel A, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 143-56, February.
  2. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-44, April.
  3. Michael Hoy, 1984. "The Impact of Imperfectly Categorizing Risks on Income Inequality and Social Welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 17(3), pages 557-68, August.
  4. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  5. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1996. "Genetic testing and human welfare: reply to Hall," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 381-384, June.
  6. Hoy, Michael, 1982. "Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 321-36, May.
  7. Borenstein, Severin, 1989. "The economics of costly risk sorting in competitive insurance markets," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 25-39, June.
  8. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
  9. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en ├ęconomie quantitative, CIREQ.
  10. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
  11. Hall, Jane, 1996. "Consumer utility, social welfare, and genetic testing. A response to "Genetic testing: an economic and contractarian analysis"," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 377-380, June.
  12. Dionne, G., 1981. "Adverse Selection and Repeated Insurance Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 8139, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  13. de Meza, David, 1983. "Health insurance and the demand for medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 47-54, March.
  14. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
  15. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
  16. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
  17. Charles Wilson, 1976. "A Model of Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 432, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  18. Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July.
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