The Inclusiveness of Exclusion
We extend Armstrong’s (1996) result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening models in two key ways, providing support for the view that this result is quite generic and applicable to many different markets. First, we relax the strong technical assumptions he imposed on preferences and consumer types. Second, we extend the result beyond the monopolistic market structure to generalized oligopoly settings with entry. We also analyse applications to several quite different settings: credit markets, automobile industry, research grants, the regulation of a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions, and involuntary unemployment in the labor market.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Rua Quatá 300, São Paulo, SP 04546-042|
Web page: http://www.insper.edu.br/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005.
"A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Staff Report 346, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2002. "A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis," Working Paper 0211, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1999. "Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 196-215, February.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Lars A. Stole, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 277-311.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- S. Basov & P. Bardsley, 2004. "A Model of Grants Distribution: A Screening Approach," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 252, Econometric Society.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
- Basov Suren & Yin Xiangkang, 2010. "Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-25, March.
- Smart, Michael, 2000.
"Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-69, February.
- Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:2003:i:69:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2001. "Competitive Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 579-605, Winter.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Paulo Klinger Monteiro & Frank Page & Benar fux Svaiter, 2001. "The one object optimal auction and the desirability of exclusion," GE, Growth, Math methods 0112002, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_211. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Naercio Menezes)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.