Renegotiation in Repeated Cournot-Duopoly
We investigate a repeated Cournot duopoly with strictly convex cost functions. In an example the set of Weakly Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium payoffs shrinks towards the joint profit maximizing payoff point as marginal costs are made to rise more rapidly.
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|Date of creation:||Sep 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Economics Letters, 1995, 47(2) pp 143-148|
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- Schultz Christian, 1994.
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- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987.
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8759, University of California at Berkeley.
- Driffill, John & Schultz, Christian, 1995.
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Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 143-148, February.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
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