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Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

Author

Listed:
  • Binmore, K.
  • Piccione, M.
  • Samuelson, L.

Abstract

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.

Suggested Citation

  • Binmore, K. & Piccione, M. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Working papers 9603r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:9603r
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point," Working Papers 2005:38, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Lee, J. & Sabourian, H., 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0419, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. D.D.B. Bragt, van & J. A. La Poutr & E. H. Gerding, 2000. "Equilibrium Selection In Evolutionary Bargaining Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000 323, Society for Computational Economics.
    4. Hamid Sabourian & Jihong Lee, 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in the Negotiation Game," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 82, Econometric Society.
    5. Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1249, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
    7. Jihong Lee & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Efficiency in Negotiation: Complexity and Costly Bargaining," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0505, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    8. Hamid Sabourian & Jihong Lee, 2004. "Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Negotiation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 401, Econometric Society.
    9. Kopp, Andreas, 1997. "Adaptive behavior, choice of residential location and localization of labor markets," Kiel Working Papers 795, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY; BARGAINING;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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