Evolutionary Stability in Bargaining with an Asymmetric Breakdown Point
We study an asymmetric two-player bargaining game with risk of breakdown and no discounting. We characterize the modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESS) by modelling strategies as automata. Payoff and complexity considerations are taken in the automata-selection process. We show that a MESS exists in the bargaining game and that agreement is reached immediately. It turns out that in the search for evolutionary foundation, we find support for all partitions that assigns the positive breakdown utility x or more to the player with the higher breakdown utility, given that it exceeds half the surplus.
|Date of creation:||15 Jun 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bolton, Gary E., 1997. "The rationality of splitting equally," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 365-381, March.
- Chatterjee, K. & Sabourian, H., 1997.
"Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
9733, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990.
"Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata,"
90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999.
"Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
500, David K. Levine.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
- Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
- Banks, J.S. & Sundaram, R.K., 1989.
"Repeated Games, Finite Automata, And Complexity,"
RCER Working Papers
183, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Giovanni Ponti & Robert M. Seymour, "undated". "Conventions and Social Mobility in Bargaining Situations," ELSE working papers 034, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Chatterjee, K. & Sabourian, S., 1999.
"N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity,"
5-99-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Kalyan Chatterjee & Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0517, Econometric Society.
- Binmore, K. & Piccione, M. & Samuelson, L., 1996.
"Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games,"
9603, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Binmore, K. & Piccione, M. & Samuelson, L., 1996. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Working papers 9603r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
- Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_038. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.