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Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

  • Binmore, Ken
  • Piccione, Michele
  • Samuelson, Larry
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B77-29/2/33d613d80b423389f530ee1ca7642742
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 80 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 257-291

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:80:y:1998:i:2:p:257-291
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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    1. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September.
    2. Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
    3. K. Binmore & L. Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 561, David K. Levine.
    4. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
    5. Piccione Michele & Rubinstein Ariel, 1993. "Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 160-168, October.
    6. Erik van Damme & Reinhard Selten & Eyal Winter, 1989. "Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit," Discussion Paper Serie A 253, University of Bonn, Germany.
    7. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    8. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
    9. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November.
    10. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    11. Piccione, Michele, 1992. "Finite automata equilibria with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 180-193, February.
    12. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    13. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    14. Werner Guth & Reinhard Tietz, 1997. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior: a survey and comparison of experimental results," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1160, David K. Levine.
    15. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    16. W. Guth & R. Schmittberger & B. Schwartz, 2010. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 291, David K. Levine.
    17. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
    18. Neme Alejandro & Quintas Luis, 1995. "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 599-608, August.
    19. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1990. "Bargaining without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 291-297, September.
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