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Why Agents for Automated Negotiations Should Be Adaptive

Author

Listed:
  • D.D.B. van Bragt

    (CWI, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science)

  • J.A. La Poutré

    (CWI, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science
    TUE, Eindhoven University of Technology)

Abstract

We show that adaptive agents on the Internet can learn to exploit bidding agents who use a (limited) number of fixed strategies. These learning agents can be generated by adapting a special kind of finite automata with evolutionary algorithms (EAs). Our approach is especially powerful if the adaptive agent participates in frequently occurring micro-transactions, where there is sufficient opportunity for the agent to learn online from past negotiations. More in general, results presented in this paper provide a solid basis for the further development of adaptive agents for Internet applications.

Suggested Citation

  • D.D.B. van Bragt & J.A. La Poutré, 2003. "Why Agents for Automated Negotiations Should Be Adaptive," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 101-118, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:netnom:v:5:y:2003:i:2:d:10.1023_a:1026021701904
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1026021701904
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    References listed on IDEAS

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