Individual and Social Learning
We use adaptive models to understand the dynamics that lead to efficient and fair outcomes in a repeated Battle of the Sexes game. Human subjects appear to easily recognize the possibility of a coordinated alternation of actions as a mean to generate an efficient and fair outcome. Yet such typical learning models as Fictitious Play and Reinforcement Learning have found it hard to replicate this particular result. We develop a model that not only uses individual learning but also the “social learning” that operates through evolutionary selection. We find that the efficient and fair outcome emerges relatively quickly in our model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Volume (Year): 29 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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