Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Simulation, Validation and Social Extensions
We describe a system for bilateral negotiations in which artificial agents aregenerated by an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The negotiations are governed bya finite-horizon version of the alternating-offers protocol. Several issuesare negotiated simulataneously. We first analyse and validate the outcomes ofthe evolutionary system, using the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibriumas a benchmark. We then present two extensions of the negotiation model. Inthe first extension agents take into account the fairness of the obtainedpayoff. We find that when the fairness norm is consistently applied during thenegotiation, agents reach symmetric outcomes which are robust and ratherinsensitive to the actual fairness settings. In the second extension we modela competitive market situation where agents have multiple bargainingopportunities before reaching the final agreement. Symmetric outcomes are nowalso obtained, even when the number of bargaining opportunities is small. Wefurthermore study the influence of search or negotiation costs in this game. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/10614/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
- Ken Binmore & Nir Vulkan, 1999. "Applying game theory to automated negotiation," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-9, October.
- Shyam NMI Sunder & Haijin Lin, 2001.
"Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm184, Yale School of Management.
- Shyam Sunder & Haijin Lin, 2003. "Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm330, Yale School of Management.
- Riechmann, Thomas, 1997.
"Learning and Behavoiral Stability - An Economic Interpretation of Genetic Algorithms,"
Hannover Economic Papers (HEP)
dp-209, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Thomas Riechmann, 1999. "Learning and behavioral stability An economic interpretation of genetic algorithms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 225-242.
- Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Zauner, Klaus G., 2001.
"Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 238-269, February.
- Miguel Costa-Gomes & Klaus G. Zauner, "undated". "Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia and the United States: A Social Utility Analysis," Discussion Papers 00/37, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998.
"Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
344, David K. Levine.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
- Binmore, K & Shaked, A & Sutton, J, 1985. "Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1178-1180, December.
- Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1988. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 806-823, September.
- Weg, Eythan & Rapoport, Amnon & Felsenthal, Dan S., 1990. "Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 76-95, March.
- Harrison, Glenn W & McCabe, Kevin A, 1996. "Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 303-327.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:compec:v:22:y:2003:i:1:p:39-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.