IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/9733.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

Author

Abstract

The authors investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n- person unanimity bargaining game. In particular, the paper provides a justification for stationary equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter. As is well-known, every individually rational allocation is sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game if players are sufficiently patient. By limiting ourselves to strategies which can be implemented by a finite-state machine and by suitably modifying the definition of complexity for the purpose of analysing a single extension form, we find that complexity costs do not reduce the range of possible allocations but do limit the amount of delay that can occur in any agreement and also do exclude use of non-stationary strategies in equilibrium. However, a `noisy Nash equilibrium' with complexity costs turns out to sustain on the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium allocation

Suggested Citation

  • Chatterjee, K. & Sabourian, H., 1997. "Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9733, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9733
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9733. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake Dyer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.