Equity, Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game
It is well known that all the experimental results concerning the Ultimatum game are at variance with its single subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. We use here Rabin's concepts of equity and fairness equilibrium to investigate these results and analyse the coordination problem of that game.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
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