IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/ppe434.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Andrés Perea
(Andres Perea)

Personal Details

First Name:Andres
Middle Name:
Last Name:Perea
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppe434
http://www.epicenter.name/Perea/

Affiliation

(50%) School of Business and Economics
Maastricht University

Maastricht, Netherlands
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/sbe
RePEc:edi:femaanl (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Research Center for Epistemic Game Theory (Epicenter)
School of Business and Economics
Maastricht University

Maastricht, Netherlands
http://www.epicenter.name/
RePEc:edi:epmaanl (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
  2. Predtetchinski A. & Herings P.J.J. & Perea A., 2002. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Game Theory and Information 0203008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  4. Asheim,G.B. & Perea,A., 2000. "Lexicographic probabilities and rationalizability in extensive games," Memorandum 38/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  5. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.
  2. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.
  3. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 126-145, May.
  4. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.
  5. Muller, Rudolf & Perea, Andres & Wolf, Sascha, 2007. "Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 344-358, November.
  6. Tim Schulteis & Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2007. "Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 373-384, February.
  7. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.
  8. Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Tim Schulteis & Dries Vermeulen, 2006. "Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 457-473, November.
  9. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
  10. Andrés Perea, 2006. "Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 529-559, November.
  11. Nicolo, Antonio & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 221-243, March.
  12. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
  13. Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres, 2002. "Supporting others and the evolution of influence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2051-2092, October.
  14. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
  15. Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen & Andrés Perea y Monsuwé, 2000. "Player splitting in extensive form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 433-450.
  16. Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans, 1997. "Characterization of Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 238-252, October.
  17. Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans, 1997. "Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 425-449, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Kang Rong, 2015. "Bargaining with split-the-difference arbitration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 441-455, September.
    2. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    3. Britz, Volker, 2018. "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-20.
    4. Miettinen, Topi & Vanberg, Christoph, 2020. "Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining," Working Papers 0679, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    5. Chung, Bobby W. & Wood, Daniel H., 2019. "Threats and promises in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 37-50.

  2. Predtetchinski A. & Herings P.J.J. & Perea A., 2002. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-period Economies," Game Theory and Information 0203008, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Imma Curiel, 2015. "Compensation rules for multi-stage sequencing games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 225(1), pages 65-82, February.
    2. Chander, Parkash & Wooders, Myrna, 2020. "Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    3. Kadam, Sangram V. & Kotowski, Maciej H., 2015. "Time Horizons, Lattice Structures, and Welfare in Multi-period Matching Markets," Working Paper Series rwp15-031, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1120, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    5. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peters, Hans, 2002. "The strong sequential core for two-period economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 465-482, December.
    6. Helga Habis & P. Herings, 2013. "Stochastic bankruptcy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 973-988, November.
    7. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    8. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2010. "A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(04), pages 407-416.
    9. Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 50-66, October.
    10. Helga Habis & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2011. "Core Concepts for Incomplete Market Economies," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1119, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    11. Habis, H. & Herings, P.J.J., 2009. "Cooperation under incomplete contracting," Research Memorandum 026, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Routledge, R.R., 2014. "Deviations, uncertainty and the core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 286-297.
    14. Németh, Tibor & Pintér, Miklós, 2017. "The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-6.
    15. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.
    16. Parkash Chander & Myrna Wooders, 2016. "The Subgame Perfect Core," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 16-00006, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    17. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

  3. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Pin, 2006. "Eight degrees of separation," Working Papers 2006_26, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    2. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "Forming Efficient Networks," Working Papers 123, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "A bargaining approach to the consistent value for NTU games with coalition structure," Game Theory and Information 0303001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2003. "Implementation of the levels structure value," Game Theory and Information 0303006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    6. Noemí Navarro & Róbert Veszteg, 2008. "Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining," Working Papers 2008-11, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    7. Noemí NAVARRO & Róbert VESZTEG, 2007. "Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 07.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    8. Navarro, Noemí & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2011. "Demonstration of power: Experimental results on bilateral bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 762-772.
    9. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "Allocation Rules for Network Games," Game Theory and Information 0303010, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  4. Asheim,G.B. & Perea,A., 2000. "Lexicographic probabilities and rationalizability in extensive games," Memorandum 38/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3200611, Harvard University Department of Economics.

  5. Laurence Kranich & Andres Perea & Hans Peters, 2000. "Dynamic Cooperative Games," Discussion Papers 00-06, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Berden, C., 2007. "The role of individual intertemporal transfers in dynamic TU-Games," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Konstantin Avrachenkov & Laura Cottatellucci & Lorenzo Maggi, 2013. "Cooperative Markov decision processes: time consistency, greedy players satisfaction, and cooperation maintenance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 239-262, February.

Articles

  1. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 367-391, April.
    2. Dato, Simon & Grunewald, Andreas & Müller, Daniel & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 681-705.
    3. Chunsheng Cui & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2018. "Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2018, pages 1-16, December.
    4. Wentao Yi & Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Yuzhong Yang, 2021. "Green Supply Chain Management with Nash Bargaining Loss-Averse Reference Dependence," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(24), pages 1-26, December.
    5. Peters, Hans, 2012. "A preference foundation for constant loss aversion," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 21-25.

  2. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Basu, Pathikrit, 2019. "Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 455-475.
    2. De Marco, Giuseppe & Romaniello, Maria, 2008. "Evolution of Coalition Structures under Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 14725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2009.

  3. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 126-145, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon, 2018. "High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    2. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2019. "An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 47-53.
    3. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2018. "A folk theorem in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with small observation cost," MPRA Paper 90381, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
    5. Awaya, Yu, 2014. "Community enforcement with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 173-186.
    6. Hino, Yoshifumi, 2018. "A folk theorem in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with small observation cost," MPRA Paper 96010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 13 Sep 2019.
    7. Miklós-Thal, Jeanine & Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "The value of recommendations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 132-147.
    8. Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue, 2012. "Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 504-516.
    9. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2016. "Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring," Discussion Papers 2016-12, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.

  4. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
    2. Bach, Christian W. & Heilmann, Conrad, 2009. "Agent connectedness and backward induction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27000, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Itai Arieli & Robert J. Aumann, 2013. "The Logic of Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Series dp652, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.

  5. Muller, Rudolf & Perea, Andres & Wolf, Sascha, 2007. "Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 344-358, November.

    Cited by:

    1. André Berger & Rudolf Müller & Seyed Hossein Naeemi, 2017. "Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 367-383, February.
    2. Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
    3. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    4. Heydenreich, B. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J. & Vohra, R., 2008. "Characterization of revenue equivalence," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Berger, A. & Müller, R.J. & Naeemi, S.H., 2010. "Path-monotonicity and incentive compatibility," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    6. Frongillo, Rafael M. & Kash, Ian A., 2021. "General truthfulness characterizations via convex analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 636-662.
    7. Heydenreich, B. & Mishra, D. & Müller, R.J. & Uetz, M.J., 2008. "Optimal mechanisms for single machine scheduling," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    8. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    9. Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018. "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 294-317.
    10. Yoon, Kiho, 2020. "Implementability with contingent contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    11. Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik, 2014. "Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 103-116.
    12. Debasis Mishra & Anup Pramanik & Souvik Roy, 2013. "Implementation in multidimensional domains with ordinal restrictions," Discussion Papers 13-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.

  6. Tim Schulteis & Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2007. "Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 373-384, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Wing-Keung Wong & Chenghu Ma, 2008. "Preferences over location-scale family," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(1), pages 119-146, October.

  7. Perea, Andres, 2007. "Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 572-586, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.

  8. Andres Perea & Hans Peters & Tim Schulteis & Dries Vermeulen, 2006. "Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 457-473, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/74, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Wiktor Adamowicz & David Bunch & Trudy Cameron & Benedict Dellaert & Michael Hanneman & Michael Keane & Jordan Louviere & Robert Meyer & Thomas Steenburgh & Joffre Swait, 2008. "Behavioral frontiers in choice modeling," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 215-228, December.
    3. Singh, Sonika & Swait, Joffre, 2017. "Channels for search and purchase: Does mobile Internet matter?," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 123-134.
    4. Wendel, S. & Dellaert, B.G.C., 2008. "Situation-Based Shifts in Consumer Web Site Benefit Salience: The Joint Role of Affect and Cognition," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2008-050-MKT, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    5. Hans Peters & Tim Schulteis & Dries Vermeulen, 2010. "Generalized stochastic dominance and bad outcome aversion," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(2), pages 285-290, July.
    6. Gummerus, Johanna & Pihlström, Minna, 2011. "Context and mobile services' value-in-use," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 521-533.
    7. Roponen, Juho & Ríos Insua, David & Salo, Ahti, 2020. "Adversarial risk analysis under partial information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 306-316.
    8. Chen Lin & Sriram Venkataraman & Sandy D. Jap, 2013. "Media Multiplexing Behavior: Implications for Targeting and Media Planning," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 310-324, March.
    9. Collier, Joel E. & Moore, Robert S. & Horky, Alisha & Moore, Melissa L., 2015. "Why the little things matter: Exploring situational influences on customers' self-service technology decisions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 703-710.
    10. Dellaert, Benedict G.C. & Arentze, Theo & Horeni, Oliver & Timmermans, Harry J.P., 2017. "Deriving attribute utilities from mental representations of complex decisions," Journal of choice modelling, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 24-38.

  9. P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006. "The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Andrés Perea, 2006. "Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 529-559, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.

  11. Nicolo, Antonio & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 221-243, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Elisabeth Gugl & Justin Leroux, 2009. "Share the Gain, Share the Pain? Almost Transferable Utility, Changes in Production Possibilities and Bargaining Solutions," Department Discussion Papers 0903, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    2. David Pérez-Castrillo & Chaoran Sun, 2021. "The Proportional Ordinal Shapley Solution for Pure Exchange Economies," Working Papers 1274, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    4. Vincent Martinet & Pedro Gajardo & Michel de Lara, 2021. "Bargaining On Monotonic Economic Environments," Working Papers hal-03206724, HAL.
    5. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2006. "An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 296-308, March.
    6. David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2004. "An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments (Revised Version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 634.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    7. Alon, Shiri & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: An axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 60-71.
    8. Antonio Nicolò & Andrés Perea y Monsuwe & Paolo Roberti, 2012. "Equal opportunity equivalence in land division," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 133-142, March.
    9. Karos, Dominik & Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2019. "The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 107-112.

  12. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & De Vito, Nicodemo, 2021. "Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    2. Asheim, Geir & Søvik, Ylva, 2003. "The semantics of preference-based belief operators," Memorandum 05/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. Yang, Chih-Chun, 2018. "Perfect forward induction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 113-116.
    4. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Working Papers 315, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July.
    6. Asheim, Geir B. & Brunnschweiler, Thomas, 2023. "Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 503-514.
    7. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games," Working Papers 287, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    9. Burkhard C. Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2019. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 332, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    10. Iryna Topolyan, 2020. "On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 183-201, March.
    11. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2004. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Research Memorandum 032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    12. Brandenburger, Adam & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2010. "Self-admissible sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 785-811, March.
    13. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "An epistemic characterization of generalized backward induction," Working Papers 60, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    14. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    15. Itai Arieli & Robert J. Aumann, 2013. "The Logic of Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Series dp652, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    16. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2006. "Epistemic foundations for backward induction: an overview," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    17. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2003. "Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 03-A009, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    18. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
    19. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2013. "Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 129-133.
    20. Jagau, Stephan & Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in psychological games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    21. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
    22. Halpern, Joseph Y., 2010. "Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179, January.
    23. Xiao Luo & Ben Wang, 2022. "An epistemic characterization of MACA," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 995-1024, June.
    24. Chlaß, Nadine & Perea, Andrés, 2016. "How do people reason in dynamic games?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145881, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    25. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
    26. Rubén Becerril-Borja & Andrés Perea, 2020. "Common belief in future and restricted past rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 711-747, September.
    27. Perea, Andrés, 2008. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-26, July.
    28. Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses, 2017. "Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 457-473, May.

  13. Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres, 2002. "Supporting others and the evolution of influence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2051-2092, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2019. "On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency," MPRA Paper 91714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2008. "On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(21), pages 1-9.
    3. Salvador Barberà, 2003. "Designing Decisions Rules for Transnational Infraestructure Projects," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 600.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

  14. Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrés Perea, 2009. "A Model of Minimal Probabilistic Belief Revision," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 163-222, August.
    2. Brandts, J. & Riedl, A.M. & van Winden, F., 2005. "Competition and well-being," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Said, Maher, 2008. "Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization," MPRA Paper 11456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2020. "Backward induction in games without perfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 207-218.
    5. Giacomo Bonanno, 2010. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties," Working Papers 171, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1071-1094, November.
    7. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Working Papers 315, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Bayesian and consistent assessments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 601-617, April.
    9. Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2020. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 135-187, May.
    10. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2017. "Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 19-29.
    11. Iryna Topolyan, 2020. "On Common Belief in Future Rationality in Games with Ambiguous Orderings of Information Sets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 183-201, March.
    12. Perea ý Monsuwé, A., 2004. "Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction," Research Memorandum 032, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    13. Battigalli, P. & Catonini, E. & Manili, J., 2023. "Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 527-551.
    14. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
    15. Carlos Pimienta, 2011. "Weakly-Bayesian and Consistent Assessments," Discussion Papers 2012-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    16. Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117950, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium," Working Papers 83, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    18. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Working Papers 208, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    19. Igal Milchtaich, 2015. "Polyequilibrium," Working Papers 2015-06, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    20. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
    21. Thomas Brzustowski & Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Balázs Szentes, 2023. "Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1334-1359, May.

  15. Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans, 1997. "Characterization of Consistent Assessments in Extensive Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 238-252, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2010. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties," Working Papers 171, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 1071-1094, November.
    3. Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Bayesian and consistent assessments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 601-617, April.
    4. Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 33, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Asheim, Geir B. & Perea, Andres, 2005. "Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 15-42, October.
    6. Asheim,G.B. & Perea,A., 2000. "Lexicographic probabilities and rationalizability in extensive games," Memorandum 38/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Peter A. Streufert, 2006. "Characterizing Consistency by Monomials and by Product Dispersions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20062, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    8. Streufert, Peter A., 2015. "An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 37-46.
    9. Carlos Pimienta, 2011. "Weakly-Bayesian and Consistent Assessments," Discussion Papers 2012-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    10. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium," Working Papers 83, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    11. Giacomo Bonanno, 2016. "Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Working Papers 208, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    12. Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021. "The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
    13. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations," Working Papers 302, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

  16. Perea y Monsuwe, Andres & Jansen, Mathijs & Peters, Hans, 1997. "Consistency of assessments in infinite signaling games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 425-449, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Tisljar, Rolf, 2002. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 21/2002, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2010-02-13

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Andres Perea
(Andres Perea) should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.