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Weakly-Bayesian and Consistent Assessments

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  • Carlos Pimienta

    (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

Abstract

A weakly-Bayesian assessment is computed applying Bayes rule at positive probability information sets. We characterize the set of extensive-forms for which the sets of weakly-Bayesian and consistent assessments coincide. In doing so we disentangle the different restrictions imposed by consistency across information sets. We apply this knowledge to strengthen weakly-Bayesian assessments and to derive conditions for equivalence with consistency that can be useful in economic applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Pimienta, 2011. "Weakly-Bayesian and Consistent Assessments," Discussion Papers 2012-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    • Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-02
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    File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2012-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Backwards induction; Weakly-Bayesian assessments; Consistent assessments; Sequential equilibrium; Extensive-forms.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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