AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium
This is a slightly extended version of a chapter prepared for the Handbook of Logics for Knowledge and Belief edited by Hans van Ditmarsch, Joseph Y. Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek, and Barteld Kooi, College Publications, London. In  (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilib- rium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the pro- posed notion is the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes a given assessment. In this paper we study restrictions on the belief revision policy encoded in a plausibility order and provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium.
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- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
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- Perea, Andres, 2002. "A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 322-338, August.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
- Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
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