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Community enforcement with observation costs

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  • Awaya, Yu

Abstract

Takahashi (2010) [12] proves a folk theorem in an environment where a continuum of players are randomly matched in each period to play the prisoner's dilemma with a different partner. A key assumption there is that a player can observe her partner's past play without any cost, while she cannot observe the past play of her partner's past partners, the partners of her partner's past partners, and so on. However, Takahashi's [12] result is not robust to the introduction of an infinitesimal cost to acquire information about partners' past play. In this note, with the help of cheap-talk communication, I prove a folk theorem by constructing an equilibrium strategy that is robust to an infinitesimal cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Awaya, Yu, 2014. "Community enforcement with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 173-186.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:173-186
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 126-145, May.
    2. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 567-588.
    3. Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 42-62, January.
    4. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
    5. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
    7. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    9. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017. "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 320-330.
    2. Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2016. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 19-33.
    3. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers (Old Series) 1721, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
    5. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2014. "Trust, but verify? When trustworthiness is observable only through (costly) monitoring," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    6. Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "A Model of Collateral," CESifo Working Paper Series 6731, CESifo.
    7. Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz, 2015. "Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 32-37.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated game; Random matching; Community enforcement; Observation cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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