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Yu Awaya

Personal Details

First Name:Yu
Middle Name:
Last Name:Awaya
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:paw28
https://sites.google.com/site/yuawaya/
Terminal Degree:2015 Department of Economics; Pennsylvania State University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Economics Department
University of Rochester

Rochester, New York (United States)
http://www.econ.rochester.edu/
RePEc:edi:edrocus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Vyacheslav Arbuzov & Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2019. "Endogenous Repo Cycles," CESifo Working Paper Series 7518, CESifo.
  2. Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "A Model of Collateral," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-098/VII, Tinbergen Institute.

Articles

  1. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  2. Awaya, Yu & Fukai, Hiroki, 2017. "A Note On “Money Is Memory“: A Counterexample," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 545-553, March.
  3. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
  4. Awaya, Yu, 2014. "Community enforcement with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 173-186.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Vyacheslav Arbuzov & Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2019. "Endogenous Repo Cycles," CESifo Working Paper Series 7518, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Kubota, So & 久保田, 荘, 2019. "Market Structure and Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria in a Decentralized Monetary Economy," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-84, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.

Articles

  1. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.

    Cited by:

    1. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
    2. Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang, 2023. "Self-evident events and the value of linking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    3. Takuo Sugaya & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1727-1761, September.
    4. Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023. "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 419-438, June.
    5. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2020. "Information exchange in cartels," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 421-446, June.
    6. Konstantinos Georgalos & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2020. "Nash versus coarse correlation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(4), pages 1178-1204, December.
    7. Qiwen Sheng & Tomislav Vukina, 2024. "Public Communication as a Mechanism for Collusion in the Broiler Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(1), pages 57-91, February.
    8. Grant, Simon & Stauber, Ronald, 2022. "Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 487-509.
    9. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
    10. Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya & Herve Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2019. "Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game," Working Papers 266042710, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    11. Aaron Barkley & David P. Byrne & Xiaosong Wu, 2022. "Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID‐19 oil price shock," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 923-941, November.
    12. Yu Awaya, 2021. "Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-10, October.
    13. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.
    14. Trivikram Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya & Herve Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2020. "Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games," Working Papers 301895429, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

  2. Awaya, Yu & Fukai, Hiroki, 2017. "A Note On “Money Is Memory“: A Counterexample," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 545-553, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Douglas Davis & Bruno Sultanum & Oleg Korenok & Peter Norman & Randall Wright, 2019. "Playing with Money," 2019 Meeting Papers 536, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Hiroki Fukai, 2019. "Imperfect monitoring is necessary for essentiality of money," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 19-26, May.
    3. Janet Hua (duplicate record) Jiang & Peter Norman & Daniela Puzzello & Bruno Sultanum & Randall Wright, 2021. "Is Money Essential? An Experimental Approach," Working Paper 21-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

  3. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Walckiers, Alexis, 2017. "A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 353-370.
    2. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 193-216, March.
    3. Hemant Bhargava & Antoine Dubus & Shiva Shekhar & David Ronayne, 2024. "The Strategic Value of Data Sharing in Interdependent Markets," Working Papers hal-04481456, HAL.
    4. Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 76, pages 1-1.
    5. Rohit Lamba & Sergey Zhuk, 2022. "Pricing with algorithms," Papers 2205.04661, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    6. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2018. "Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 58-87.
    7. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    8. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payo Sets Converge in Repeated Games?," TSE Working Papers 17-792, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Stefan Napel & Dominik Welter, 2017. "Responsibility-based allocation of cartel damages," Working Papers 171, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    10. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    11. Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    12. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03760756, HAL.
    13. Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017. "Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    15. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ali I. Ozkes, 2023. "Strategic environment effect and communication," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 588-621, July.
    16. Harrington, Joseph E., 2017. "A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 140-158.
    17. Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    18. Melissa Carlson & Barbara Koremenos, 2021. "Cooperation Failure or Secret Collusion? Absolute Monarchs and Informal Cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 95-135, January.
    19. Aaron Barkley & David P. Byrne & Xiaosong Wu, 2022. "Price effects of calling out market power: A study of the COVID‐19 oil price shock," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 923-941, November.
    20. Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
    21. Do, Jihwan, 2022. "Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    22. Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication," CEPA Discussion Papers 75, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    23. Yu Awaya, 2021. "Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-10, October.
    24. David Spector, 2022. "Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion," Post-Print halshs-03760756, HAL.

  4. Awaya, Yu, 2014. "Community enforcement with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 173-186.

    Cited by:

    1. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2017. "Trust, but verify? Monitoring, inspection costs, and opportunism under limited observability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 320-330.
    2. Berger, Ulrich & Grüne, Ansgar, 2016. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 19-33.
    3. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation as a Natural Monopoly," Working Papers 17-21R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Thomas Wiseman, 2015. "A Note on the Essentiality of Money under Limited Memory," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(4), pages 881-893, October.
    5. Goeschl, Timo & Jarke, Johannes, 2014. "Trust, but verify? When trustworthiness is observable only through (costly) monitoring," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    6. Yu Awaya & Hiroki Fukai & Makoto Watanabe, 2017. "A Model of Collateral," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-098/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Araujo, Luis & Camargo, Braz, 2015. "Limited monitoring and the essentiality of money," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 32-37.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BAN: Banking (3) 2017-11-05 2017-12-03 2019-02-25
  2. NEP-DGE: Dynamic General Equilibrium (2) 2017-12-03 2019-02-25
  3. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (2) 2017-12-03 2019-02-25
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2017-11-05

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