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On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency

Author

Listed:
  • Bergantiños, Gustavo
  • Massó, Jordi
  • Neme, Alejandro

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, plurality voting, Borda methods and Condorcet winners to our setting from the point of view of their consistency and internal stability properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2019. "On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency," MPRA Paper 91714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:91714
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/91714/1/MPRA_paper_91714.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2015. "The division problem under constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 56-77.
    2. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
    3. Barbera, S. & Maschler, M. & Shalev, J., 2001. "Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 40-78, October.
    4. Jackson, M.O.Matthew O. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2004. "The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 278-308, April.
    5. D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006. "On Exiting After Voting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April.
      • Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "On exiting after voting," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 30(2 Year 20), pages 261-288, December.
    6. Duygu Nizamogullari & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2015. "Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 217-225, September.
    7. Dolors Berga & Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "Stability and voting by committees with exit," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 229-247, October.
    8. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.
    9. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2017. "On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 857-875, April.
    10. Nizamogullari, Duygu & Özkal-Sanver, İpek, 2014. "Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 34-42.
    11. Barbera, Salvador & Perea, Andres, 2002. "Supporting others and the evolution of influence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(12), pages 2051-2092, October.
    12. Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1992. "Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 218-227, February.
    13. Sobel, Joel, 2000. "A Model of Declining Standards," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 295-303, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internal Stability; Consistency; Efficiency; Anonymity; Neutrality; Participation;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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