Stability and voting by committees with exit
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- D. Berga & G. Bergantiños & J. Massó & A. Neme, 2006.
"On Exiting After Voting,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 33-54, April.
- Berga, Dolors & Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2003. "On Exiting after Voting," Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona 6, Department of Economics, University of Girona.
- Dolors Berga & Alejandro Neme & Jordi Massó & Gustavo Bergantiños, 2008. "On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(21), pages 1-9.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2004:i:11:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
- Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2016. "Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 20-29.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2007.
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Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 137-146, September.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Sung, S.C. & Xu, Y., 2003. "Procedural Group Identification," Discussion Paper 2003-10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2011. "Procedural group identification," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 383, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Dimitrov, D.A. & Sung, S.C. & Xu, Y., 2003. "Procedural Group Identification," Other publications TiSEM 4679f50d-350f-4c56-b228-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2018.
"On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 83-97, January.
- Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2019. "On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency," MPRA Paper 91714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sidartha Gordon, 2015.
"Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
- Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2014-10, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," Sciences Po publications 2014-10, Sciences Po.
- Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," Working Papers hal-01061994, HAL.
- Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.
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