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Keith Waehrer

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First Name:Keith
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Last Name:Waehrer
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RePEc Short-ID:pwa76
http://www.waehrer.net
Bates White, LLC 1300 Eye Street, NW Suite 600E Washington, DC 20005

Affiliation

Bates White, LLC

http://www.bateswhite.com
Washington, DC

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Keith Waehrer & Patrick Greenlee, 2004. "The Effect of Cross Ownership on Competition in Auction Markets," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 129, Econometric Society.
  2. Keith Waehrer & Martin Perry, 2002. "The Effects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets," Departmental Working Papers 200203, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  3. Keith Waehrer, 1997. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9702004, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1997.

Articles

  1. Keith Waehrer, 2004. "Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 465-477, April.
  2. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
  3. Keith Waehrer, 2003. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information Is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(4), pages 605-622, October.
  4. Keith Waehrer, 1999. "The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 171-181.
  5. Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.
  6. Keith Waehrer & Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 1998. "Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bid Takers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 179-192, Spring.
  7. Waehrer Keith, 1995. "A Model of Auction Contracts with Liquidated Damages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 531-555, December.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Keith Waehrer & Martin Perry, 2002. "The Effects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets," Departmental Working Papers 200203, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2008. "Bidding rings and the winner's curse," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1018-1041.
    2. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2002. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions," Departmental Working Papers 200205, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    4. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2008. "Information Concentration in Common Value Environments," Working papers 2012-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Mergers in Bidding Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1279, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
    8. Raskovich, Alexander, 2007. "Ordered bargaining," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 1126-1143, October.
    9. Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
    10. Jesse A. Schwartz & Ricardo Ungo, 2003. "Merging Auction Houses," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0303, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    11. Jin, Mingzhou & Wu, S. David, 2006. "Supplier coalitions in on-line reverse auctions: Validity requirements and profit distribution scheme," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 183-194, April.
    12. Jeddy, Mohamed & Larue, Bruno, 2012. "Mergers, concurrent marketing mechanisms and the performance of sequential auctions," Working Papers 126945, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    13. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
    14. Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Munich Reprints in Economics 22072, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    15. Bernard Lebrun, 2015. "Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 245-275, June.
    16. Miller, Nathan H., 2014. "Modeling the effects of mergers in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 201-208.
    17. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    18. Alexander Raskovich, 2006. "Ordered Bargaining," EAG Discussions Papers 200610, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    19. Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    20. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2003. "Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market," Working Papers 74, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    21. Mares Vlad & Shor Mikhael, 2012. "On the Competitive Effects of Bidding Syndicates," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, September.
    22. Gugler, Klaus Peter & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2015. "Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Steven Tschantz & Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb, 2000. "Mergers in Sealed versus Oral Auctions," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 201-212.
    24. Kumar, Vikram & Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Samkharadze, Lily, 2015. "Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 71-80.
    25. Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 78-80, April.

  2. Keith Waehrer, 1997. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9702004, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1997.

    Cited by:

    1. Garrone, Paola & Groppi, Angelamaria, 2012. "Siting locally-unwanted facilities: What can be learnt from the location of Italian power plants," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 176-186.
    2. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2008. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-11, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Rudy Santore, 2014. "Noxious Facilities, Environmental Damages, and Efficient Randomized Siting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 57(1), pages 101-116, January.

Articles

  1. Keith Waehrer, 2004. "Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(4), pages 465-477, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.

  2. Waehrer, Keith & Perry, Martin K, 2003. " The Effects of Mergers in Open-Auction Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 287-304, Summer.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Keith Waehrer, 2003. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information Is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(4), pages 605-622, October. See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Keith Waehrer, 1999. "The ratchet effect and bargaining power in a two-stage model of competitive bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(1), pages 171-181.

    Cited by:

    1. Ajay Kalra & Shibo Li, 2008. "Signaling Quality Through Specialization," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(2), pages 168-184, 03-04.
    2. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
    3. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2015. "Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project," MPRA Paper 72108, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 21 Apr 2015.
    4. Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Ding, Wei & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2009. "Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 261, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.

  5. Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Burguet & Martin Perry, 2002. "Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed Bid Auctions," Departmental Working Papers 200205, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    2. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2014. "Optimal sequential auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 61-71.
    3. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Mergers in Bidding Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-012/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Thomas, Charles J., 2011. "Vertical mergers in procurement markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 200-209, March.
    6. Estelle Cantillon, 2000. "The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1279, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Francoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Post-Print hal-00659016, HAL.
    8. Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2006. "Optimal sequential auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4911, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
    10. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Bernard Lebrun, 2004. "Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2004_2, York University, Department of Economics.
    12. Tong Li & Bingyu Zhang, 2015. "Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 188-214, May.
    13. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083318, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    14. Lebrun, Bernard, 2009. "Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1341-1351, May.
    15. Vincent van den Berg, 2012. "Advantaged Bidders in Franchise Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-117/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. de Frutos, M. Angeles, 2000. "Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 48-71, October.
    17. Chernomaz, Kirill, 2012. "On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 690-710.
    18. Charles J. Thomas, 2010. "INFORMATION REVELATION AND BUYER PROFITS IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT COMPETITION -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 79-105, March.
    19. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
    20. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2014. "Preferred Suppliers in Asymmetric Auction Markets," Working Papers 791, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    21. Thomas, Charles J., 2004. "The competitive effects of mergers between asymmetric firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 679-692, May.
    22. Charles J. Thomas, 2017. "Profitable Horizontal Mergers Without Efficiencies Can Increase Consumer Surplus," Working Papers 17-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    23. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2003. "Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in Auction Market," Working Papers 74, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    24. Thomas, Charles J., 1997. "Disincentives for cost-reducing investment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 359-363, December.
    25. Gugler, Klaus Peter & Weichselbaumer, Michael & Zulehner, Christine, 2015. "Analysis of mergers in first-price auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10799, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 157, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of Business and Economic Studie (IBES).
    27. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Mécanismes d'échange en présence d'externalités," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/7238 edited by Forges, Françoise, April.
    28. Kumar, Vikram & Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Samkharadze, Lily, 2015. "Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 71-80.
    29. Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 78-80, April.

  6. Keith Waehrer & Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 1998. "Auction Form Preferences of Risk-Averse Bid Takers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 179-192, Spring.

    Cited by:

    1. Estrella Alonso & Gustavo Juan Tejada, 2012. "The Auction Model with Lowest Risk in a Duopolistic Electricity Market," Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 0, pages 3-21, January-D.
    2. Menicucci, Domenico, 2006. "Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-300, May.
    3. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2002. "(Sub-)Optimal Entry Fees," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Rosar, Frank, 2014. "Secret reserve prices in first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 65-74.
    5. Eso, Peter & Futo, Gabor, 1999. "Auction design with a risk averse seller," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 71-74, October.
    6. Audrey Hu & Steven A. Matthews & Liang Zou, 2009. "Risk Aversion and Optimal Reserve Prices in First and Second-Price Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2000. "An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(1), pages 1-12, January.
    8. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2008. "Auctions under Payoff Uncertainty: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-044/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 22 Apr 2008.
    9. Walley, Matthew J.C. & Fortin, David R., 2005. "Behavioral outcomes from online auctions: reserve price, reserve disclosure, and initial bidding influences in the decision process," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 58(10), pages 1409-1418, October.
    10. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    11. Simon Stevenson & James Young, 2015. "The Role of Undisclosed Reserves in English Open Outcry Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-402, June.
    12. Andrew M. Davis & Elena Katok & Anthony M. Kwasnica, 2011. "Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 177-192, January.
    13. Budde, Maximilian & Minner, Stefan, 2014. "First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(1), pages 370-382.
    14. Fangcheng Tang & Weizhou Zhong & Shunfeng Song, 2006. "Tenders with Different Risk Preferences in Construction Industry," Working Papers 06-006, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
    15. Eso, Peter, 2005. "An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 78-89, November.
    16. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.
    17. Goeree, Jacob K. & Offerman, Theo & Schram, Arthur, 2006. "Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 555-581, May.

  7. Waehrer Keith, 1995. "A Model of Auction Contracts with Liquidated Damages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 531-555, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Fabian Herweg & Marco A. Schwarz, 2016. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5838, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Bucciol, Alessandro & Chillemi, Ottorino & Palazzi, Giacomo, 2013. "Cost overrun and auction format in small size public works," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 35-42.
    3. Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & Esther Hauk, 2009. "Limited Liability and Mechanism Design in Procurement," Working Papers 383, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2001. "High Bids and Broke Winners," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12665, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    6. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
    7. Matthew Roelofs, 2002. "Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 233-252, December.
    8. Alessandro Bucciol & Ottorino Chillemi & Giacomo Palazzi, 2011. "Cost Overrun and Auction Format in Public Works," Working Papers 17/2011, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
    9. Chang, Wei-Shiun & Salmon, Timothy C. & Saral, Krista Jabs, 2013. "Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation and Wealth Constraints," MPRA Paper 50137, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Ottorino Chillemi & Claudio Mezzetti, 2014. "Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 335-355, February.
    11. Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Bidding and renegotiation in procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(8), pages 1577-1597, August.
    12. Sarah Parlane, 2003. "Procurement contracts under limited liability," Open Access publications 10197/685, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    13. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    14. Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2017. "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ET: Economic Theory 253215, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    15. Vlad Radoias & Simon J. Wilkie & Michael A. Williams, 2017. "Rules of evidence and liability in contract litigation: The efficiency of the General Dynamics rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(6), pages 1139-1150, December.
    16. Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2018. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: The case of conservation contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(1), pages 368-380.
    17. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2010. "Debt- Versus Equity-Financing in Auction Designs," Staff General Research Papers Archive 31517, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    18. Herweg, Fabian & Schwarz, Marco A., 2017. "Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 56, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    19. Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the Highest Bidder Loses the Auction: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," 2009 Meeting Papers 130, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    20. Kreiss, Jan & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Haufe, Marie-Christin, 2017. "Appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support – Prequalifications and penalties," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 512-520.
    21. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2014. "Bidding under auctioneer default risk," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 123-133.

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NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
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