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Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Perry

    (Rutgers University)

  • Jozsef Sakovics

    (University of Edinburgh)

Abstract

The buyer of a homogeneous input employs split-award contracting to divide his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. The buyer uses a sequential second-price auction to award a larger primary contract and a smaller secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers participating in the auctions, we find that the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost of not winning the secondary contract. With fixed costs of participating in the auction, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price paid by the buyer. An optimal secondary contract can internalize the cost reductions from the new industry capacity and extract the rents of the suppliers. An optimal secondary contract can be particularly beneficial when the number of suppliers is limited by high fixed costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Perry & Jozsef Sakovics, 2002. "Auctions for Split-Award Contracts," Departmental Working Papers 200204, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200204
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2020. "Affirmative Action Through Endogenous Set-Asides," QM&ET Working Papers 20-1, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    3. Gong, Jiong & Li, Jianpei & McAfee, R. Preston, 2012. "Split-award contracts with investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 188-197.
    4. Jose Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, 2016. "Proportional payoffs in legislative bargaining with weighted voting: a characterization," Discussion Papers 2016-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    5. Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Retail Mergers, Buyer Power and Product Variety," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 45-67, January.
    6. Sarah Parlane & Ying-Yi Tsai, 2013. "Optimal Contract Orders and Relationship-Specific Investments in Vertical Organizations," Working Papers 201316, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    7. Bergman , Mats A. & Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2016. "Squeezing the last drop out of your suppliers: an empirical study of market-based purchasing policies for generic pharmaceuticals," Umeå Economic Studies 921, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    8. Milliou Chrysovalantou, 2008. "Technological Proximity and Exclusive Buyer-Supplier Relationships," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
    9. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2013. "Competition for procurement shares," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 193-208.
    10. José Alcalde & Matthias Dahm, "undated". "Supplier Diversity before the Time of Cholera," Discussion Papers in Economics 20/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    11. Bergman, Mats & Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2016. "Squeezing the last drop out of your suppliers: an empirical study of market-based purchasing policies for generic pharmaceuticals," HUI Working Papers 116, HUI Research.
    12. Mats A. Bergman & David Granlund & Niklas Rudholm, 2017. "Squeezing the Last Drop Out of Your Suppliers: An Empirical Study of Market-Based Purchasing Policies for Generic Pharmaceuticals," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 79(6), pages 969-996, December.
    13. Lluis Bru & Daniel Cardona & Jozsef Sakovics, 2023. "Buying from the Fringe (too)," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 310, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    14. Fugger, Nicolas & Laitenberger, Ulrich, 2020. "Split-award auctions and supply disruptions," ZEW Discussion Papers 20-082, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    15. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2019. "Dual sourcing with price discovery," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 225-246.
    16. Bichler, Martin & Schneider, Stefan & Guler, Kemal & Sayal, Mehmet, 2011. "Compact bidding languages and supplier selection for markets with economies of scale and scope," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 214(1), pages 67-77, October.
    17. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2024. "On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 63-90.
    18. Tunay I. Tunca & Qiong Wu, 2009. "Multiple Sourcing and Procurement Process Selection with Bidding Events," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 763-780, May.
    19. Milliou, Chrysovalantou, 2004. "Exclusive dealing and compatibility of investments," UC3M Working papers. Economics we044919, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    20. Lauton, Felix & Rothkopf, Alexander & Pibernik, Richard, 2019. "The value of entrant manufacturers: A study of competition and risk for donor-funded procurement of essential medicines," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 272(1), pages 292-312.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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