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Risk Aversion, Transparency, and Market Performance

Author

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  • M. Ángeles de Frutos

    (Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid,)

  • Carolina Manzano

    (Department of Economics, Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Abstract

Using a model of market making with inventories based on Biais (1993), we find that investors obtain more favorable execution prices, and they hence invest more, when markets are fragmented. In our model, risk-averse dealers use less aggressive price strategies in more transparent markets (centralized) because quote dissemination alleviates uncertainty about the prices quoted by other dealers and, hence, reduces the need to compete aggressively for order flow. Further, we show that the move toward greater transparency (centralization) may have detrimental effects on liquidity and welfare. Copyright The American Finance Association 2002.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ángeles de Frutos & Carolina Manzano, 2002. "Risk Aversion, Transparency, and Market Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(2), pages 959-984, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:57:y:2002:i:2:p:959-984
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    Cited by:

    1. Lescourret, Laurence & Robert, Christian Y., 2011. "Transparency matters: Price formation in the presence of order preferencing," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 227-258, May.
    2. Menkveld, Albert J., 2008. "Splitting orders in overlapping markets: A study of cross-listed stocks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 145-174, April.
    3. He, Yinghua & Nielsson, Ulf & Guo, Hong & Yang, Jiong, 2014. "Subscribing to transparency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 189-206.
    4. Zhuo Zhong & Kei Kawakami, 2016. "The Risk Sharing BenefiÂ…t versus the Collateral Cost: The Formation of the Inter-Dealer Network in Over-the-Counter Trading," 2016 Meeting Papers 822, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Lescourret, Laurence & Robert, Christian Y., 2006. "Preferencing, internalization and inventory position," ESSEC Working Papers DR 06017, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    6. Pham, Thu Phuong & Westerholm, P. Joakim, 2013. "A survey of research into broker identity and limit order book," Working Papers 17212, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics, revised 16 Oct 2013.
    7. José Ramón Martínez-Resano, 2005. "Size and heterogeneity matter. A microstructure-based analysis of regulation of secondary markets for governments bonds," Occasional Papers 0501, Banco de España;Occasional Papers Homepage.
    8. Zhong, Zhuo, 2016. "Reducing opacity in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 1-27.

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