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Transparency matters: Price formation in the presence of order preferencing

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  • Lescourret, Laurence
  • Robert, Christian Y.

Abstract

Using a market-making inventory model, we analyze the impact of order preferencing on dealers' quoting behavior by changing the degree of quote disclosure. We find that preferenced orders raise the inventory-holding costs of preferenced dealers, making them less able to post attractive quotes. In turn, competitors choose less aggressive prices, but still attract more likely public orders. Price competition is smoothed and expected market spreads widen. Promoting competition might be, however, enforced by (i) fine tuning through the degree of market transparency, (ii) favoring the entry of unpreferenced dealers, or (iii) requiring preferenced market-makers to have more funding capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Lescourret, Laurence & Robert, Christian Y., 2011. "Transparency matters: Price formation in the presence of order preferencing," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 227-258, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finmar:v:14:y:2011:i:2:p:227-258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laurence Lescourret, 2012. "Non-fundamental Information and Market-makers' Behavior during the NASDAQ Preopening Session," Post-Print hal-00772798, HAL.
    2. Moinas, Sophie & Nguyen, Minh & Valente, Giorgio, 2017. "Funding Constraints and Market Illiquidity in the European Treasury Bond Market," TSE Working Papers 17-814, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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