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J. Philipp Reiss

Personal Details

First Name:J. Philipp
Middle Name:
Last Name:Reiss
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pre114
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://io.econ.kit.edu

Affiliation

Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Karlsruhe Institut für Technologie

Karlsruhe, Germany
http://www.wiwi.kit.edu/

:


RePEc:edi:fwkitde (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. David Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & J. Philipp Reiss, 2017. "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse," Discussion Papers dp17-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  2. Masiliunas, Aidas & Mengel, Friederike & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2014. "Behavioral variation in Tullock contests," Working Paper Series in Economics 55, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
  3. Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan, 2013. "Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79926, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  4. Kimbrough Erik O. & Reiss J. Philipp, 2012. "Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  5. J. Philipp Reiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2011. "Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment," TWI Research Paper Series 70, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  6. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidders - Theory and Experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-066, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  7. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  8. Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  9. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  10. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Out-of equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-021, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  11. Reiss J. Philipp & Wolff Irenaeus, 2007. "Non-monotonic Repayment Contracts are Superior: An Experimental Approach," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  12. Reiss, J. Philipp & Sch�ndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  13. Heinz Handler & Bertrand Koebel & Philipp Reiss & Margit Schratzenstaller, 2005. "The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe," Public Economics 0507011, EconWPA.
  14. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  15. Philipp Reiss & Jens Robert Schondube, 2004. "On Entry And Bidding In Sequential Procurement Auctions," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 57, Royal Economic Society.
  16. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "Bidding with Outside Options," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

Articles

  1. J. Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff, 2014. "Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 586-614, December.
  2. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2011. "Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1361-1397, December.
  3. J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010. "First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
  4. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
  5. Brosig, Jeannette & Rei[ss], J. Philipp, 2007. "Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 50-74, January.
  6. Rei[ss], J. Philipp & Weinert, Lutz, 2005. "Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-86, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Masiliunas, Aidas & Mengel, Friederike & Reiss, J. Philipp, 2014. "Behavioral variation in Tullock contests," Working Paper Series in Economics 55, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Zhuoqiong & Ong, David & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "The Gender Difference in the Value of Winning," MPRA Paper 67098, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    3. Roman M. Sheremeta & William A. Masters & Timothy N. Cason, 2012. "Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results," Working Papers 12-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anwesha Mukherjee & Theodore L. Turocy, 2016. "That's the ticket: Explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-07, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Lian Jian & Zheng Li & Tracy Xiao Liu, 2017. "Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(3), pages 648-669, September.

  2. Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan, 2013. "Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79926, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Cited by:

    1. David Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & J. Philipp Reiss, 2017. "Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder's curse," Discussion Papers dp17-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

  3. Kimbrough Erik O. & Reiss J. Philipp, 2012. "Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Brice Corgnet & Antonio M. Espín & Roberto Hernán-González, 2015. "The cognitive basis of social behavior: cognitive reflection overrides antisocial but not always prosocial motives," Working Papers 15-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    2. Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Schröder, Marina, 2017. "Acts of helping and harming," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 77-79.
    3. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2016. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," ECON - Working Papers 225, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Schröder, Marina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2014. "The Desire to Influence Others," Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100283, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Aidin Hajikhameneh & Jared Rubin, 2017. "Reputation and Multilateral Punishment under Uncertainty," Working Papers 17-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    6. Björn Bartling & Nick Netzer, 2014. "An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 4771, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Mill, Wladislaw, 2017. "The spite motive in third price auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 71-73.
    8. Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann, 2013. "On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games," Discussion Papers 2012-50A, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    9. Zhang, Le & Ortmann, Andreas, 2016. "Pro-social or anti-social, or both? A within- and between-subjects study of social preferences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 23-32.

  4. J. Philipp Reiss & Irenaeus Wolff, 2011. "Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment," TWI Research Paper Series 70, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.

    Cited by:

    1. J. Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff, 2014. "Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 586-614, December.

  5. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidders - Theory and Experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-066, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Cervone & Stefano Galavotti & Marco LiCalzi, 2009. "Symmetric Equilibria in Double Auctions with Markdown Buyers and Markup Sellers," Working Papers 187, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
    2. Shachat, Jason & Wei, Lijia, 2013. "Discrete Rule Learning and the Bidding of the Sexes," MPRA Paper 47953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2012. "Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 317-333, March.
    4. Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
    5. Tobias Scheffel & Georg Ziegler & Martin Bichler, 2012. "On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 15(4), pages 667-692, December.

  6. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    Cited by:

    1. J. Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff, 2014. "Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 586-614, December.
    2. David Schmidt & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 200506, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
    3. Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha F llbrunn, 2013. "Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-10, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.

  7. Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    Cited by:

    1. Teresa, Briz & Drichoutis, Andreas & Nayga, Rodolfo & House, Lisa, 2011. "Examining Projection Bias in Experimental Auctions: The Role of Hunger and Immediate Gratification," MPRA Paper 44764, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Mar 0013.
    2. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Theodore L. Turocy & Elizabeth Watson, 2012. "Reservation Values and Regret in Laboratory First-Price Auctions: Context and Bidding Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 1163-1180, April.
    4. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2017. "Subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry: A panel quantile regression analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 113-131.
    5. Ulrike Malmendier & Young Han Lee, 2011. "The Bidder's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 749-787, April.
    6. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Salmon, Timothy C., 2008. "Revenue equivalence revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 171-192, September.
    8. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    9. Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha F llbrunn, 2013. "Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-10, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    10. Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Ro�i Zultan, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms and Bidder Collusion: Bribes, Signals and Selection," Working Papers 734, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Zultan, Ro’i, 2017. "Collusion and information revelation in auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 84-102.
    12. Sascha Füllbrunn & Stefan Kreiner & Stefan Palan, 2015. "The value of a fallback option," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 375-388, June.

  8. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Out-of equilibrium bids in auctions - Wrong expectations or wrong bids," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-021, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

    Cited by:

    1. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista Jabs, 2013. "Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis," MPRA Paper 43665, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  9. Reiss, J. Philipp & Sch�ndube Jens Robert, 2007. "First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model," Research Memorandum 003, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    Cited by:

    1. Budde, Maximilian & Minner, Stefan, 2015. "Optimal capacity provision for service providers with subsequent auctioning of projects," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 170(PB), pages 652-662.
    2. Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    3. Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.

  10. Heinz Handler & Bertrand Koebel & Philipp Reiss & Margit Schratzenstaller, 2005. "The size and performance of public sector activities in Europe," Public Economics 0507011, EconWPA.

    Cited by:

    1. Faridah Djellal & Faïz Gallouj, 2013. "The productivity Challenge in Services: Measurement and Strategic Perspectives," Post-Print halshs-01133198, HAL.
    2. Heinz Handler & Andreas Knabe & Bertrand Koebel & Margit Schratzenstaller & Sven Wehke, 2005. "The Impact of Public Budgets on Overall Productivity Growth," WIFO Working Papers 255, WIFO.
    3. Seri, Paolo & Zanfei, Antonello, 2013. "The co-evolution of ICT, skills and organization in public administrations: Evidence from new European country-level data," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 160-176.
    4. Faridah Djellal & Faïz Gallouj, 2011. "Beyond Productivity Measurement and Strategies: Performance Evaluation and Strategies in Services," Post-Print halshs-01113986, HAL.
    5. Ad van Riet & Moreno Roma, 2006. "Competition, productivity and prices in the euro area services sector," Occasional Paper Series 44, European Central Bank.
    6. Faridah Djellal & Faïz Gallouj, 2006. "Les services publics à l’épreuve de la productivité et la productivité à l’épreuve des services publics," Post-Print halshs-01113831, HAL.
    7. Sotiris Theodoropoulos, 2012. "Seeking a sustainable size and structure for the Greek public sector’s activities according to the fiscal pact for Euro," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 62(3-4), pages 75-92, July - De.

  11. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "The overbidding-myth and the underbidding-bias in first-price auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Ahmad, Husnain Fateh, 2015. "Endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 46-63.

  12. Philipp Reiss & Jens Robert Schondube, 2004. "On Entry And Bidding In Sequential Procurement Auctions," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 57, Royal Economic Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Brosig, Jeannette & Rei[ss], J. Philipp, 2007. "Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 50-74, January.

  13. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "Bidding with Outside Options," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

    Cited by:

    1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana, 2003. "Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 1172, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Articles

  1. J. Reiß & Irenaeus Wolff, 2014. "Incentive effects of funding contracts: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(4), pages 586-614, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß, 2011. "Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(557), pages 1361-1397, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan, 2013. "Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79926, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Kemal Guler & Martin Bichler & Ioannis Petrakis, 2016. "Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 609-639, May.
    3. Neri, Claudia, 2012. "Eliciting Beliefs in Continuous-Choice Games: A Double Auction Experiment," Economics Working Paper Series 1207, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Dec 2012.
    4. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    5. Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha F llbrunn, 2013. "Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-10, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    6. Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
    7. Brueggemann, J. & Crosetto, P. & Meub, L. & Bizer, K., 2015. "Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation: experimental evidence," Working Papers 2015-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    8. Ratan, Anmol, 2015. "Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 119-121.
    9. Brüggemann, Julia & Meub, Lukas, 2017. "Experimental evidence on the effects of innovation contests," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 72-83.

  3. J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010. "First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Brosig, Jeannette & Rei[ss], J. Philipp, 2007. "Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 50-74, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Reiß, J. Philipp, 2004. "Bidding with Outside Options," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-21, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    2. J. Reiß & Jens Schöndube, 2010. "First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 99-141, April.
    3. Heinrich, Timo & Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, 2015. "Promises and Social Distance in Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112892, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Reiss, J. Philipp & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Oliver Kirchkamp & J. Philipp Reiß & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2008. "A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    6. He, Haoran & Chen, Yefeng & Last Name, First Name, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms for Allocating Subsidies for Carbon Emissions Reduction: An Experimental Investigation," Discussion Papers dp-14-06-efd, Resources For the Future.
    7. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Oliver Kirchkamp & Eva Poen & J. Philipp Reiß, 2008. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    9. Heinrich, Timo, 2011. "Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 253, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    10. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    11. Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2017. "Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information," Working Papers 1127, Economic Research Forum, revised 08 Oct 2017.
    12. Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Heinrich, Timo & Helbach, Christoph, 2012. "Exploring the Capability to Backward Induct – An Experimental Study with Children and Young Adults," Ruhr Economic Papers 360, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

  6. Rei[ss], J. Philipp & Weinert, Lutz, 2005. "Entrepreneurs, moral hazard, and endogenous growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 69-86, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Héctor Salgado-Banda, 2005. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis," DEGIT Conference Papers c010_031, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 14 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (11) 2004-06-13 2008-02-02 2008-03-25 2008-03-25 2008-09-13 2011-10-15 2012-08-23 2012-10-20 2012-12-06 2014-02-02 2017-02-19. Author is listed
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2007-01-23 2007-03-17 2008-03-25 2008-03-25 2008-03-25 2008-09-13 2017-02-19. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2011-10-15 2012-10-20 2012-12-06
  4. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (3) 2011-10-15 2012-10-20 2012-12-06
  5. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (2) 2012-10-20 2012-12-06
  6. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2008-03-25 2008-09-13
  7. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (1) 2012-12-06
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2004-09-30
  9. NEP-EEC: European Economics (1) 2005-07-25
  10. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (1) 2014-02-15
  11. NEP-GRO: Economic Growth (1) 2014-02-15
  12. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2007-03-17
  13. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2005-07-25
  14. NEP-SOG: Sociology of Economics (1) 2014-02-15

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