Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction
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- Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
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More about this item
KeywordsExperiments; Auction; Expectations;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-03-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)
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