Out‐Of‐Equilibrium Bids in First‐Price Auctions: Wrong Expectations or Wrong Bids
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- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Reiss, J. Philipp & Levin, Dan, 2013. "Could we overcome the Winner's Curse by (behavioral) auction design?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79926, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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"Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game,"
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- Tibor Neugebauer & Sascha F llbrunn, 2013. "Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game," LSF Research Working Paper Series 13-10, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
- Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
- Brüggemann, Julia & Crosetto, Paolo & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2016.
"Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation. Experimental evidence,"
Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 2054-2068.
- Brüggemann, Julia & Crosetto, Paolo & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2015. "Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation: Experimental evidence," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 227, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Julia Brüggemann & Paolo Crosetto & Lukas Meub & Kilian Bizer, 2016. "Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation. Experimental evidence," Post-Print hal-01359146, HAL.
- Brueggemann, J. & Crosetto, P. & Meub, L. & Bizer, K., 2015. "Intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation: experimental evidence," Working Papers 2015-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
- Ratan, Anmol, 2015. "Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 119-121.
- Kemal Guler & Martin Bichler & Ioannis Petrakis, 2016. "Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 609-639, May.
- repec:eee:iepoli:v:39:y:2017:i:c:p:72-83 is not listed on IDEAS
- Claudia Neri, 2015.
"Eliciting beliefs in continuous-choice games: a double auction experiment,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 569-608, December.
- Neri, Claudia, 2012. "Eliciting Beliefs in Continuous-Choice Games: A Double Auction Experiment," Economics Working Paper Series 1207, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, revised Dec 2012.
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