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Citations of
Edward Simpson Prescott

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The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

  1. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing And Bank Capital Regulation," Working Papers wp2004_0412, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2004. "Economic And Regulatory Capital. What Is The Difference?," Working Papers wp2004_0422, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Javier Díaz-Giménez & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Flat Tax Reforms In The U.S.: A Boon For The Income Poor," Working Papers wp2006_0611, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009. "On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy," MPRA Paper 16836, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    4. Aleix Calveras & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2005. "Regulation And Opportunism: How Much Activism Do We Need?," Working Papers wp2005_0508, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Beatriz Dominguez & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2006. "R&D In The Pharmaceutical Industry: A World Of Small Innovation," Working Papers wp2006_0601, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Jose Ceron & Javier Suarez, 2006. "Hot And Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," Working Papers wp2006_0603, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  2. David A. Marshall & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2002. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved action and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper Series WP-02-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Abel Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, 2004. "Economic And Regulatory Capital. What Is The Difference?," Working Papers wp2004_0422, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Javier Díaz-Giménez & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Flat Tax Reforms In The U.S.: A Boon For The Income Poor," Working Papers wp2006_0611, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Aleix Calveras & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2005. "Regulation And Opportunism: How Much Activism Do We Need?," Working Papers wp2005_0508, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Beatriz Dominguez & Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2006. "R&D In The Pharmaceutical Industry: A World Of Small Innovation," Working Papers wp2006_0601, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Jose Ceron & Javier Suarez, 2006. "Hot And Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," Working Papers wp2006_0603, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Rangan Gupta, 2004. "Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements," Working papers 2004-33, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]

  3. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Edward S. Prescott, 2001. "Regulating bank capital structure to control risk," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 35-52. [Downloadable!]
    2. John P. Harding & Xiaozhing Liang & Stephen L. Ross, 2007. "The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt," Working papers 2007-29, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    3. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Elijah Brewer, III & George G. Kaufman & Larry D. Wall, 2008. "Bank capital ratios across countries: why do they vary?," Working Paper 2008-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
    6. P.J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in the banking industry," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 634, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    7. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2003. "Loan Pricing Under Basel Capital Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 3917, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
    8. Donsyah Yudistira, 2002. "The Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Indonesia," Finance 0212002, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2003. [Downloadable!]
    9. Gianni De Nicolo, 2001. "Size, charter value, and risk in banking: an international perspective," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 197-215.
    10. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    11. Adolfo Barajas & Ralph Chami & Thomas F. Cosimano, 2005. "Did the Basel Accord cause a Credit Slowdown in Latin America?," IMF Working Papers 05/38, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    12. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing and bank capital regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 47-63. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    13. Gianni De Nicoló & John H. Boyd, 2003. "Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited," IMF Working Papers 03/114, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    14. Peter J.G. Vlaar, 2003. "On the Influence of capital Requirements on Competition and Risk taking in Banking," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 102, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    15. Peter J.G. Vlaar, 2000. "Capital requirements and competition in banking industry," Working Paper Series WP-00-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]

  4. Edward S. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2000. "Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information," Working Paper 00-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    2. Jérome Pouyet & Bernard Salanié & Francois Salanié, 2008. "On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
    3. Frank Milne & David Kelsey, 2005. "Externalities, Monopoly and the Objective Function of the Firm," Working Papers 1078, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Robert M. Townsend & Jacob Yaron, 2001. "The credit risk-contingency system of an Asian development bank," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 31-48. [Downloadable!]
    5. Alexander Karaivanov, 2003. "Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Garratt, Rod & Keister, Todd & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium and Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case," Working Papers 02-07, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2005. "Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information : technical appendix," Working Paper 05-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    8. Joon Song, 2007. "Futures Market: Contractual Arrangement to Restrain Moral Hazard in Teams," Economics Discussion Papers 633, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    9. Joao Correia-da-Silva & Carlos Herves-Beloso, 2008. "General equilibrium with private state verification," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000024, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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    10. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2002. "Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Redistributions with Scarcity of Capital," Les Cahiers de Recherche 788, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
    11. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2001. "Occupational Choice, incentives and wealth distribution," Les Cahiers de Recherche 720, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Edward S. Prescott & John A. Weinberg, 2000. "Incentives, communication, and payment instruments," Working Paper 00-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. John A. Weinberg, 2002. "Imperfect competition and the pricing of interbank payment services," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 51-66. [Downloadable!]

  6. Edward S. Prescott, 1998. "Computing moral-hazard problems using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm," Working Paper 98-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    3. Andreas Lehnert, 1998. "Asset pooling, credit rationing, and growth," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-52, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    4. Edward S. Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78. [Downloadable!]

  7. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 1996. "Theory of the firm: applied mechanism design," Working Paper 96-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Bennardo & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2003. "Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000748, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1997. "Clearing, settlement, and monetary policy," Working Paper 97-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Consommation, partage de risque et assurance informelle : développements théoriques et tests empiriques récents," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(1), pages 115-149, Mars. [Downloadable!]
    4. Edward S. Prescott, 1997. "Group lending and financial intermediation: an example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 23-48. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2006. "Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 644-671, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2004. "Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 777-800, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Edward S. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2000. "Firms as clubs in Walrasian markets with private information," Working Paper 00-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  4. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing and bank capital regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 47-63. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  5. Simpson Prescott, Edward & Weinberg, John A., 2003. "Incentives, communication, and payment instruments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 433-454, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  6. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2003. "Firms, assignments, and earnings," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 69-81. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Tommaso Ciarli & André Lorentz & Maria Savona & Marco Valente, 2008. "The Effect of Consumption and Production Structure on Growth and Distribution. A Micro to Macro Model," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
    2. Andrew Foerster & Leonardo Martinez, 2006. "Are we working too hard or should we be working harder? A simple model of career concerns," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 79-91. [Downloadable!]
    3. Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300. [Downloadable!]

  7. Prescott, Edward Simpson & Townsend, Robert M., 2002. "Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 282-310, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Working Papers 02-08, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Brink, R. van den & Ruys, P.H.M., 2005. "Technological change, wages and firm size," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
    3. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2003. "Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 214, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. M. Kugler & R. Oppes, 2005. "Collateral and Risk Sharing in group lending: evidence from an urban microcredit program," Working Paper CRENoS 200509, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
    5. Christian Ahlin & Robert Townsend, 2003. "Selection into and across Credit Contracts: Theory and Field Research," Working Papers 0323, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    6. René van den Brink & Robert P. Gilles, 2003. "Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-102/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Rene van den Brink & Pieter H.M. Ruys, 2005. "Positional Wages, Market Wages and Firm Size," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-020/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

  8. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Huberto M. Ennis & H.S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 21-44. [Downloadable!]
    2. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. [Downloadable!]
    3. Antoine Martin, 2003. "A guide to deposit insurance reform," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 29-54. [Downloadable!]

  9. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  10. Edward S. Prescott, 2001. "Regulating bank capital structure to control risk," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 35-52. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Huberto M. Ennis & H.S. Malek, 2005. "Bank risk of failure and the too-big-to-fail policy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 21-44. [Downloadable!]
    2. John A. Weinberg, 2002. "Competition among bank regulators," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 19-36. [Downloadable!]

  11. Edward S. Prescott, 1999. "A primer on moral-hazard models," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 47-78. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Prescott, Edward & Shell, Karl, 2002. "Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries," Working Papers 02-08, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    2. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Working Paper 04-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Edward S. Prescott, 2002. "Can risk-based deposit insurance premiums control moral hazard?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 87-100. [Downloadable!]
    4. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Alexander Karaivanov, 2002. "Computing Moral Hazard Programs With Lotteries Using Matlab," Computational Economics 0201001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    6. Richter, Francisca G.-C. & Diaz, Edgar F. Pebe & Brorsen, B. Wade & Currier, Kevin, 2003. "Using Both Sociological and Economic Incentives to Reduce Moral Hazard," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(02), August. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Alexander Karaivanov, 2003. "Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 25, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
    9. Rodolfo Apreda, 2001. "The Brokerage of Asymmetric Information," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 190, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]

  12. Edward S. Prescott & Daniel D. Tatar, 1999. "Means of payment, the unbanked, and EFT '99," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 49-70. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Angela C. Lyons & Erik Scherpf, 2005. "Moving from unbanked to banked: evidence from the Money Smart program," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr. [Downloadable!]
    2. Todd Vermilyea & James A. Wilcox, 2002. "Who is unbanked, and why: results from a large, new survey of low- and moderate-income individuals," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 442-468. [Downloadable!]
    3. Edward S. Prescott & John A. Weinberg, 2000. "Incentives, communication, and payment instruments," Working Paper 00-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. John P. Caskey, 2001. "Reaching out to the unbanked," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr, pages 81-92. [Downloadable!]
    5. Ethan Cohen-Cole, 2008. "Credit card redlining," Quantitative Analysis Unit Working Paper QAU08-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
    6. Sherrie L.W. Rhine & Maude Toussaint-Comeau & Jeanne M. Hogarth & William H. Greene, 2001. "The role of alternative financial service providers in serving LMI neighborhoods," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr, pages 59-80. [Downloadable!]
    7. Telyukova, Irina A., 2009. "Household Need for Liquidity and the Credit Card Debt Puzzle," MPRA Paper 6674, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. William H. Greene & Sherrie L.W. Rhine & Maude Toussaint-Comeau, 2003. "The importance of check-cashing businesses to the unbanked: racial/ethnic differences," Working Paper Series WP-03-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  13. Edward S. Prescott, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-50. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 137-143. [Downloadable!]
    2. Shuji Kobayakawa, 1998. "Designing incentive-compatible regulation in banking: the role of penalty in the precommitment approach," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Oct, pages 145-153. [Downloadable!]
    3. David A. Marshall & Edward S. Prescott, 2000. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Working Paper Series WP-00-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1997. "Bank capital standards for market risk: a welfare analysis," Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation WP-97-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
    5. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, . "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England. [Downloadable!]
    6. A.W.A. Boot & S. Dezelan & T.T. Milbourn, 2000. "Regulation and the Evolution of the Financial Services Industry," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 50, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]

  14. Edward S. Prescott, 1997. "Group lending and financial intermediation: an example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 23-48. [Downloadable!]

    Cited by:

    1. Becchetti Leonardo & Pisani Fabio, 2006. "Microfinance with divisible investment projects," Departmental Working Papers 242, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
    2. Woerz, Julia, 1999. "Group Lending and Its Implications in Credit Markets for Poor People," Transition Economics Series 12, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
    3. Isik, Haci B. & Sohngen, Brent, 2003. "Performance-Based Voluntary Group Contracts For Nonpoint Source Pollution," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22064, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
    4. Becchetti Leonardo & Pisani Fabio, 2007. "Promoting access to credit for small uncollateralized producers: moral hazard, subsidies and local externalities under different group lending market structures," Departmental Working Papers 249, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

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