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Parsing the content of bank supervision

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Abstract

We measure bank supervision using the database of supervisory issues, known as matters requiring attention or immediate attention, raised by Federal Reserve examiners to banking organizations. The volume of supervisory issues increases with banks? asset size, especially for the largest and most complex banks, and decreases with profitability and the quality of the loan portfolio. Stressed banks are faster at resolving issues, but all else equal, resolving new issues takes longer the more issues a bank faces, which may suggest capacity constraints in addressing multiple supervisory issues. Using computational linguistic methods on the text of the issue description, we define five categorical issue topics. The subset of issues related to capital levels and loan portfolio are the most consequential in terms of regulatory rating downgrades and are directly related to changes in banks? balance sheet characteristics and profitability. Other issues appear to reflect soft information and are less correlated with bank observables. By categorizing questions asked by analysts at banks? quarterly earnings calls using the same linguistic approach, we find that market monitors raise issues similar to those of supervisors when the issues are related to hard information (such as loan quality or capital) and public supervisory assessment programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Beverly Hirtle & David O. Lucca, 2016. "Parsing the content of bank supervision," Staff Reports 770, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:770
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Charles W. Calomiris & Mark Carlson, 2022. "Bank Examiners’ Information and Expertise and their Role in Monitoring and Disciplining Banks Before and During the Panic of 1893," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2-3), pages 381-423, March.
    2. Turrell, Arthur & Thurgood, James & Djumalieva, Jyldyz & Copple, David & Speigner, Bradley, 2018. "Using online job vacancies to understand the UK labour market from the bottom-up," Bank of England working papers 742, Bank of England.
    3. Ananthan Nambiar & Tobias Rubel & James McCaull & Jon deVries & Mark Bedau, 2021. "Dropping diversity of products of large US firms: Models and measures," Papers 2110.08367, arXiv.org.
    4. Cookson, J. Anthony & Moon, S. Katie & Noh, Joonki, 2020. "Imprecise and Informative: Lessons from Market Reactions to Imprecise Disclosure," SocArXiv akt2c, Center for Open Science.
    5. Akey, Pat & Grégoire, Vincent & Martineau, Charles, 2022. "Price revelation from insider trading: Evidence from hacked earnings news," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1162-1184.
    6. Akey, Pat & Grégoire, Vincent & Martineau, Charles, 2021. "Price Revelation from Insider Trading: Evidence from Hacked Earnings News," SocArXiv qe6tu, Center for Open Science.
    7. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
    8. Simon Fritzsch & Philipp Scharner & Gregor Weiß, 2021. "Estimating the relation between digitalization and the market value of insurers," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 88(3), pages 529-567, September.
    9. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Gustaf Bellstam & Sanjai Bhagat & J. Anthony Cookson, 2021. "A Text-Based Analysis of Corporate Innovation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(7), pages 4004-4031, July.
    11. Berninger, Marc & Kiesel, Florian & Schiereck, Dirk & Gaar, Eduard, 2021. "Citations and the readers’ information-extracting costs of finance articles," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    12. Bholat, David & Brookes, James & Cai, Chris & Grundy, Katy & Lund, Jakob, 2017. "Sending firm messages: text mining letters from PRA supervisors to banks and building societies they regulate," Bank of England working papers 688, Bank of England.
    13. Lüdering, Jochen & Tillmann, Peter, 2020. "Monetary policy on twitter and asset prices: Evidence from computational text analysis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    14. Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel, 2021. "The Effects of Investors' Information Acquisition On Sell-Side Analysts Forecast Bias," MPRA Paper 110059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Bholat, David & Broughton, Nida & Ter Meer, Janna & Walczak, Eryk, 2019. "Enhancing central bank communications using simple and relatable information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 1-15.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank supervision; bank regulation; market monitoring; text classification; Latent Dirichlet Allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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