Institutions that rely on joint liability to facilitate lending to the poor have a long history and are now a common feature of many developing countries. Economists have proposed several theories of joint liability lending that stress various aspects of its informational and enforcement advantages over other forms of lending. This paper analyzes how joint-liability lending promotes screening, monitoring, state verification, and enforcement of repayment. An empirical section draws on case studies to highlight how joint liability works in practice.
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Paper provided by Economic Growth Center, Yale University in its series Working Papers with number
791.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913 O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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