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Costly State Monitoring and Reserve Requirements

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Author Info
Rangan Gupta (University of Connecticut and University of Pretoria)

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Abstract

The paper explores one rationale behind the existence of financial repression, with the latter being represented through the obligatory "high" reserve requirement for the banks. Using an overlapping generation production-economy-monetary model characterized by the possibility of banking crisis, we try and answer whether at all these high reserve requirements are related to discipline the banks. Results indicate that economies with higher probability of banking crisis should optimally choose higher income taxation. The correlation between optimal reserve requirements and probability of crisis is positive only when the social planner has exhausted his ability of income taxation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2004-33.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision: Jul 2005
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-33

Note: This is a revised version of the fifth chapter of my dissertation at the University of Connecticut. I am particularly grateful to my advisors Christian Zimmermann and Dhammika Dharmapala for many helpful comments and discussions. All remaining errors are mine. Email: Rangan.2.Gupta@huskymail.uconn.edu
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Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Phone: (860) 486-4889
Fax: (860) 486-4463
Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
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Related research
Keywords: Reserve requirements; Tax evasion; Information Asymmetry in Financial Markets; Costly state verification.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rangan Gupta, 2008. "Currency Substitution and Financial Repression," Working Papers 200806, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Optimal Public Policy with Endogenous Mortality," Working Papers 200829, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Misalignment in the Growth-Maximizing Policies under Alternative Assumptions of Tax Evasion," Working Papers 200819, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Openness, Bureaucratic Corruption and Public Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model," Working Papers 200817, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rangan Gupta & Emmanuel Ziramba, 2008. "Tax Evasion and Financial Repression: A Reconsideration Using Endogenous Growth Models," Working Papers 200808, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
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