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Financial Contracts and Occupational Choice

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  • Alexander Karaivanov

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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 with number 25.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf3:25

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Keywords: Development; Occupational Choice; Moral Hazard; Financial Intermediation; Maximum Likelihood Estimation;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Karaivanov, Alexander, 2012. "Financial constraints and occupational choice in Thai villages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 201-220.
  2. Anna L. Paulson & Robert Townsend, 2003. "Distinguishing limited commitment from moral hazard in models of growth with inequality," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago WP-03-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

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