IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/recofi/ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3812.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat

Author

Listed:
  • Jezabel Couppey

Abstract

[eng] Towards a new scheme of prudential regulation : a contribution to the debate . This article presents a new scheme of prudential regulation with three characteristics, which could lead regulation towards improved efficiency. First, this scheme is three-fold, because it combines regulation, internal control and market discipline. The regulation starts with « pre-commitment » and imposes a solvency rule in the case of a regulated agent defection. The pre-commitment allows for the integration of the internal control ; market discipline is provided by a public disclosure constraint concerning the institution’s solvability. Second, it is dynamic because it takes into account, period by period, the regulator and regulated agents’ reactions. Third, it is global since it is intended to be applied to all regulated financial intermediaries (banking institutions, investment enterprises and insurance companies). . JEL Classification : D82, G2, G28, L51 [fre] Cet article propose un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle qui présente trois caractéristiques fondamentales propres à guider la réglementation vers une plus grande efficacité. Premièrement, ce schéma est un « tryptique régulateur » au sens où il intègre la réglementation, le contrôle interne et la discipline de marché. La réglementation prend la forme d’un processus de coercition graduée combinant dans le temps la flexibilité du « pré-engagement » à la rigueur d’une règle stricte de solvabilité en fonction de la conformité de l’établissement visé à son engagement en capital. Le préengagement initiant le schéma permet l’intégration complète du contrôle interne, tandis que la discipline de marché est activée par une procédure de «divulgation publique » des informations concernant la solvabilité de l’établissement. Deuxièmement, il est «dynamique » au sens où il tient compte, de période en période, des réactions possibles des agents (réglementés et régulateur). Troisièmement, il est « global » car son application vise l’ensemble des intermédiaires financiers réglementés (établissements de crédit, entreprises d’investissement et entreprises d’assurance). . Classification JEL : D82, G2, G28, L51

Suggested Citation

  • Jezabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 37-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3812
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3812
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecofi.2000.3812?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-128, February.
    2. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1999. "Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-157.
    3. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "A pre-commitment approach to capital requirements for market risk," Proceedings 475, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    4. Paul H. Kupiec, 1995. "Techniques for verifying the accuracy of risk measurement models," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. James L. Pierce, 1993. "The functional approach to deposit insurance and regulation," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 111-130.
    6. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach in a model of regulatory banking capital," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-50.
    7. Raj Aggarwal & Kevin T. Jacques, 1998. "Assessing the impact of prompt corrective action on bank capital and risk," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 23-32.
    8. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. David H. Pyle., 1997. "Bank Risk Management: Theory," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-272, University of California at Berkeley.
    10. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    11. Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(2), pages 355-367, May.
    12. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1995. "The use of bank trading risk models for regulatory capital purposes," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 95-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. George J. Benston, 1993. "Market discipline: the role of uninsured depositors and other market participants," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 37, pages 65-95.
    14. Dana Jr. James D., 1993. "The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 288-310, April.
    15. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
    16. David A. Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1996. "Bank capital for market risk: a study in incentive compatible regulation," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1997. "Agency Incentives and Reputational Distortions: a Comparison of the Effectiveness of Value-at-Risk and Pre-commitment in Regulating Market Risk," Bank of England working papers 69, Bank of England.
    2. Arupratan Daripa & Simone Varotto, 1998. "Value at risk and precommitment: approaches to market risk regulation," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 4(Oct), pages 137-143.
    3. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Solvency regulations and the management of banking risks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 981-990, April.
    4. Jose A. Lopez, 1996. "Regulatory Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-51, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2000. "Subordinated debt and bank capital reform," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2000-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    6. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
    7. João A. C. Santos, 2000. "Bank capital regulation in contemporary banking theory: a review of the literature," BIS Working Papers 90, Bank for International Settlements.
    8. Casellina, Simone & Pandolfo, Giuseppe & Quagliariello, Mario, 2020. "Applying the Pre-Commitment Approach to bottom-up stress tests: A new old story," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    9. Paul H. Kupiec & James M. O'Brien, 1997. "The pre-commitment approach: using incentives to set market risk capital requirements," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Jézabel Couppey, 2000. "Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla00006, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    11. Jézabel Couppey, 2000. "Towards a new prudential regulation scheme: a contribution to the debate [Vers un nouveau schéma de réglementation prudentielle : une contribution au débat]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03727581, HAL.
    12. Dimson, Elroy & Marsh, Paul, 1997. "Stress tests of capital requirements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(11-12), pages 1515-1546, December.
    13. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. Georges Dionne, 2003. "The Foundationsof Banks' Risk Regulation: A Review of Literature," THEMA Working Papers 2003-46, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    15. Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Methods for evaluating value-at-risk estimates," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 3-17.
    16. María Soledad Martínez & Sergio Schmukler, 1999. "Do Depositors Punish Banks For "Bad" Behavior?: Examining Market Discipline In Argentina, Chile, And Mexico," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 48, Central Bank of Chile.
    17. Maximilian J.B. Hall, 2001. "The basle Committee's proposals for a new capital adequacy assessment framework: a critique," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 111-179.
    18. Lang, William W. & Robertson, Douglas D., 2002. "Analysis of proposals for a minimum subordinated debt requirement1," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-136.
    19. David Marshall & Subu Venkataraman, 1999. "Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-157.
    20. Alistair Milne & A Elizabeth Whalley, 1999. "Bank capital and risk taking," Bank of England working papers 90, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3812. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecofi .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.