Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Trading Frenzies and their Impact on Real Investment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Itay Goldstein

    ()

  • Emre Ozdenoren

    ()

  • Kathy Yuan

    ()

Abstract

We study a model where a capital provider learns from the price of a firm’s security in deciding how much capital to provide for new investment. This feedback effect from the financial market to the investment decision gives rise to trading frenzies, where speculators all wish to trade like others, generating large pressure on prices. Coordination among speculators is sometimes desirable for price informativeness and investment efficiency, but speculators’ incentives push in the opposite direction, so that they coordinate exactly when it is undesirable. We analyse the effect of various market parameters on the likelihood of trading frenzies to arise.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/DP670PWC20_2011_TradingFrenzies.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Financial Markets Group in its series FMG Discussion Papers with number dp670.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp670

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, 04.
  2. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach," NBER Working Papers 15883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Bru, Lluís & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Informational Externalities, Herding and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2005. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con," NBER Working Papers 11537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan, 1995. "Financial System Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 1197, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Itay Goldstein & Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, 2011. "Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 263-292.
  7. Laura Veldkamp, 2004. "Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices," 2004 Meeting Papers 539, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  9. Philip Bond & Itay Goldstein & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2010. "Market-Based Corrective Actions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(2), pages 781-820, February.
  10. Dasgupta, Amil, 2007. "Coordination and delay in global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 195-225, May.
  11. Hirshleifer, David & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 1994. " Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information before Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1665-98, December.
  12. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2005. "Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 36(2), pages 1-66.
  13. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2006. "Media Frenzies in Markets for Financial Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 577-601, June.
  14. Hart, Oliver D. & Kreps, David M., 1986. "Price Destabilizing Speculation," Scholarly Articles 3448679, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Fulghieri, Paolo & Lukin, Dmitry, 2001. "Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-42, July.
  16. Hirshleifer, David & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 2004. "Feedback and the Success of Irrational Investors," Working Paper Series 2004-8, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  17. Vives, Xavier, 1993. "How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 329-47, April.
  18. Dow, James & Gorton, Gary, 1997. " Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1087-1129, July.
  19. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 106-122, Spring.
  20. Amador, Manuel & Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2006. "Learning from Private and Public Observation of Other's Actions," MPRA Paper 109, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  22. Aleh Tsyvinski & Arijit Mukherji & Christian Hellwig, 2006. "Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1769-1787, December.
  23. Diego García & Günter Strobl, 2011. "Relative Wealth Concerns and Complementarities in Information Acquisition," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(1), pages 169-207.
  24. Gadi Barlevy & Pietro Veronesi, 2000. "Rational Panics and Stock Market Crashes," CRSP working papers 483, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  25. Manuel Amador & Pierre Olivier Weill, 2008. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," 2008 Meeting Papers 390, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  26. Yuanzhi Luo, 2005. "Do Insiders Learn from Outsiders? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1951-1982, 08.
  27. repec:bla:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:823-845 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Leland, Hayne E, 1992. "Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 859-87, August.
  29. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 1999. "The Going-Public Decision and the Development of Financial Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1045-1082, 06.
  30. Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, 2008. "Feedback Effects and Asset Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1939-1975, 08.
  31. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Wall Street and Silicon Valley: A Delicate Interaction," NBER Working Papers 13475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Jayant Vivek Ganguli & Liyan Yang, 2009. "Complementarities, Multiplicity, and Supply Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 90-115, 03.
  33. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-35, November.
  34. Tarek A. Hassan & Thomas M. Mertens, 2011. "The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment," NBER Working Papers 17027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Itay Goldstein & Alexander Guembel, 2008. "Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 133-164.
  36. repec:bla:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:133-164 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Elias Albagli & Christian Hellwig & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2011. "Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives," NBER Working Papers 17330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Sheridan Titman, 2013. "Financial Market Shocks and the Macroeconomy," NBER Working Papers 19383, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, 2013. "Predatory Short Selling," NBER Working Papers 19514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Pablo Kurlat & Laura Veldkamp, 2012. "Should We Regulate Financial Information," Working Papers 12-15, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach," Discussion Papers 1502, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Philip Bond & Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein, 2011. "The Real Effects of Financial Markets," NBER Working Papers 17719, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Tarek Alexander Hassan & Thomas Mertens, 2014. "Information Aggregation in a DSGE Model," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2014, Volume 29 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Jennie Bai & Thomas Philippon & Alexi Savov, 2013. "Have Financial Markets Become More Informative?," NBER Working Papers 19728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Tarek A. Hassan & Thomas M. Mertens, 2014. "Information Aggregation in a DSGE Model," NBER Working Papers 20193, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp670. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (The FMG Administration).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.