Optimal bonuses and deferred pay for bank employees: implications of hidden actions with persistent effects in time
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- Arantxa Jarque & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2010. "Optimal bonuses and deferred pay for bank employees : implications of hidden actions with persistent effects in time," Working Paper 10-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
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- Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation," MPRA Paper 59456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Arantxa Jarque & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2013. "Banker compensation and bank risk taking: the organizational economics view," Working Paper 13-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Borys Grochulski, 2011. "Financial firm resolution policy as a time-consistency problem," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 133-152.
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