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Microfinance, subsidies and local externalities

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  • Leonardo Becchetti

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  • Fabio Pisani

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11187-008-9125-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.

Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 309-321

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Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:309-321

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100338

Related research

Keywords: Microfinance; Group lending; Subsidies; G21; L26; O16;

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References

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  1. Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Discussion Papers 98-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  2. Helmut Bester, 1990. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," CEPR Financial Markets Paper, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ 0001, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
  3. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & BRUCE C. PETERSEN, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 351-66, September.
  5. de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz & Gollier, Christian, 2000. "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 632-43, July.
  6. Cressy, Robert, 1996. "Are Business Startups Debt-Rationed?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1253-70, September.
  7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 2000. "Group lending with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 773-784, May.
  8. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October.
  9. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-92, May.
  10. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  11. Yuk-Shee Chan & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Finance, EconWPA 0411019, EconWPA.
  12. Kenichi Ueda, 2001. "Transitional Growth with Increasing Inequality and Financial Deepening," IMF Working Papers 01/108, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Aydogan Alti, 2003. "How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 707-722, 04.
  14. Shubhashis Gangopadhyay & Maitreesh Ghatak & Robert Lensink, 2005. "Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1005-1015, October.
  15. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  16. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2000. "Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 601-31, July.
  17. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
  18. Robert Cressy, 2006. "Why do Most Firms Die Young?," Small Business Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 103-116, 03.
  19. Jonathan Conning, 2000. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  20. Edward S. Prescott, 1997. "Group lending and financial intermediation: an example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 23-48.
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Cited by:
  1. Alejandro Cid & José María Cabrera, 2012. "Joint-Liability vs. Individual Incentives in the Classroom. Lessons from a Field Experiment with Undergraduate Students," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1206, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
  2. Ashfaq Ahmad Khan & Wiqar Ahmad, 2013. "Matching resources with demand: a flawed strategy?," Asia-Pacific Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 20(1), pages 63-89, June.

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