Microfinance, subsidies and local externalities
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Small Business Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100338
Microfinance; Group lending; Subsidies; G21; L26; O16;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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