Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Voting with the wallet

Contents:

Author Info

  • Leonardo Becchetti

    ()

Abstract

The vote with the wallet is a new, emerging feature of economic participation and democracy in the globally integrated market economy. This expression identifies the pivotal role that responsible consumption and investment can play in addressing social and environmental emergencies which have been aggravated by the asymmetry of power between domestic institutions and global corporations. In this paper, we examine (both in general and by using examples drawn from the financial and non-financial sectors) how “voting” for producers which are at the forefront of a three-sided efficiency which reconciles the creation of economic value with social and environmental responsibility may generate contagion effects by triggering ethical imitation of traditional profit-maximizing actors, thereby enhancing the production of positive social and environmental externalities. Within this new framework, policies that reduce the search and information costs of voting with the wallet may help socioeconomic systems to exploit the bottom-up market forces of other-regarding preferences, thereby enhancing opportunities to achieve well-being with reduced top-down government intervention. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12232-012-0166-9
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 59 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 245-268

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:3:p:245-268

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12232

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Other-regarding preferences; Fair trade; Ethical finance; A13; I31;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz & Gollier, Christian, 2000. "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 632-43, July.
  2. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-25, March.
  3. Poret Sylvaine & Chambolle Claire, 2007. "Fair Trade Labeling: Inside or Outside Supermarkets?," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, November.
  4. Charness, Gary B & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0dc3k4m5, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  5. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  6. Redfern, Andy & Snedker, Paul, 2002. "Creating market opportunities for small enterprises : experiences of the fair trade movement," ILO Working Papers 357069, International Labour Organization.
  7. Hong, Kesseley & Bohnet, Iris, 2004. "Status and Distrust: The Relevance of Inequality and Betrayal Aversion," Working Paper Series rwp04-041, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  8. Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti, 2009. "Corporate social responsibility and stock market performance," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(16), pages 1283-1293.
  9. Freeman, Richard Barry, 1997. "Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor," Scholarly Articles 4632239, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 2000. "Group lending with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 773-784, May.
  11. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  12. Leonardo Becchetti & Pierluigi Conzo, 2009. "Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness: field experiment in microfinance and consequences on causality in impact studies," Econometica Working Papers wp17, Econometica.
  13. Tilman Becker & Michael Carter & Jörg Naeve, 2005. "Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
  14. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 585-608, June.
  15. Cooter, Robert, 1998. "Expressive Law and Economics," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt3w34j60j, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  16. David Canning & Clifford W. Jefferson & John E. Spencer, 1999. "Optimal Credit Rationing in Not-For-Profit Financial Institutions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1866, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  17. Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers 791, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  18. Ernst Fehr, 2009. "On the economics and biology of trust," IEW - Working Papers 399, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  19. Richard Carson & Nicholas Flores & Norman Meade, 2001. "Contingent Valuation: Controversies and Evidence," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(2), pages 173-210, June.
  20. Maseland, Robbert & Vaal, Albert de, 2001. "How fair is fair trade?," Research Report 01C48, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  21. David Reinstein & Joon Song, 2008. "Efficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade," Economics Discussion Papers 651, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  22. Leonardo Becchetti & Benjamin Huybrechts, 2008. "The Dynamics of Fair Trade as a Mixed-form Market," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 733-750, September.
  23. Shubhashis Gangopadhyay & Maitreesh Ghatak & Robert Lensink, 2005. "Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1005-1015, October.
  24. Becchetti, Leonardo & Conzo, Pierluigi, 2011. "Enhancing capabilities through credit access: Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 265-278.
  25. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
  26. James Andreoni & John Miller, 2002. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 737-753, March.
  27. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-44, June.
  28. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  29. Bauer, Bob & Koedijk, Kees & Otten, Roger, 2002. "International Evidence on Ethical Mutual Fund Performance and Investment Style," CEPR Discussion Papers 3452, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Banerjee, Abhijit & Duflo, Esther, 2010. "Giving Credit Where it is Due," CEPR Discussion Papers 7754, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2000. "Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 95, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  32. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  33. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  34. LeClair, Mark S., 2002. "Fighting the Tide: Alternative Trade Organizations in the Era of Global Free Trade," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 949-958, June.
  35. Leonardo Becchetti & Marco Costantino, 2010. "Fair Trade in Italy: Too Much ‘Movement’ in the Shop?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 181-203, April.
  36. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
  37. Malcomson, James M, 1981. "Unemployment and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 848-66, December.
  38. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October.
  39. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  40. Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring.
  41. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2003. "Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 419-445, 09.
  42. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2000. "Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 601-31, July.
  43. Sonnemans, Joep & Schram, Arthur & Offerman, Theo, 1999. "Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 35-41, January.
  44. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  45. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2007. "Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1645-1663, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:3:p:245-268. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.